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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (2007) confers jurisdiction on this Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Matrix appeals from the trial court's (1) grant of Innerlight's Motion for
Summary Judgment; (2) denial of Matrix's Motion for Summary Judgment; and
(3) the rulings on the parties' respective Motions to Strike. While Matrix
characterizes these questions as presenting four issues for review, in substance this
appeal involves only two: (1) whether the trial court properly disposed of the
cross motions for summary judgment; and (2) whether the trial court was within
the bounds of its discretion in its rulings on the competing motions to strike.
Issue No. 1: Did the trial court properly resolve the parties' cross motions
for summary judgment when it granted Innerlight's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Matrix's?
Standard of Review: When reviewing a trial court's decision on summary
judgment, this court reviews "whether the trial court correctly applied the
governing law and correctly ruled that there were no disputed issues of material
fact." Harper v. Great Salt Lake Council Inc., 1999 UT 34, If 9, 976 P.2d 1213.
Issue No.2: Did the trial court correctly resolve the parties' motions to
strike?
Standard of Review: To the extent that the trial court's decision hinged
upon its determination that the evidence involved was admissible or inadmissible
as a matter of law, the decision is reviewed for correctness, but to the extent that
1
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the court's decision resulted from its inherent authority to evaluate the
admissibility of evidence, the decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Fordv. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2004 UT 70, \ 33, n. 5, 98 P.3d 15.
The posture Matrix has assumed on appeal also presents this Court with the
following additional issue which is dispositive of Matrix's appeal:.
Issue No. 3: Are Matrix's arguments on appeal precluded by alternative,
dispositive trial court rulings that Matrix failed to challenge and brief on appeal,
and which are now considered established?
Standard of Review: Issues decided by the trial court and not challenged
on appeal are considered abandoned and thus summarily affirmed. See, e.g.,
Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339,fflf17-20, 79 P.3d 974.
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
No Constitutional Provisions are involved. However, to the extent
necessary for this Court to fully review the Matrix's claims, Utah Code sections
70A-1-103, 70A-2-201, 70A-2-208, and 70A-2-305(4) (2007) may be implicated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Innerlight, Inc. ("Innerlight") began this action by filing a petition
for Declaratory Relief on March 13, 2006, (R.13.) Among other things, Innerlight
asked the trial court to declare that the executory agreement (the "Agreement")
that Innerlight had negotiated with The Matrix Group ("Matrix") was
unenforceable because Matrix failed to satisfy a condition precedent to transform
the Agreement from an executory document into an enforceable contract, (R. 13.)
2
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Innerlight subsequently filed an amended complaint which it served upon Matrix
on April 20, 2006. (R. 24.)
Matrix moved to dismiss Innerlight's complaint (R. 31), arguing that Utah
was an improper venue for the parties' dispute. The trial court denied the motion.
(R. 121.)1 Matrix filed an Answer and Counterclaim on July 21, 2007. (R. 110111.)
Innerlight then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asking the trial court
to declare the Agreement ineffective and unenforceable for failure of the condition
precedent, which, if granted, would end the parties' dispute. (R. 136.) Matrix
opposed Innerlight's Motion (R. 534), and filed a cross motion for summary
judgment. (R. 221.)
In addition to its cross motion for summary judgment, Matrix moved to
strike a single paragraph of the Affidavit of Innerlight's Wesley Tate ("Tate"),
which Innerlight had filed to support its summary judgment motion. (R. 412.)
Innerlight later moved to strike sections of the Third Affidavit of Matrix's
Anthony Catinella, which Matrix had attached to its Reply Memorandum in
Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 720, 743.) Matrix did not
oppose Innerlight's motion to strike. (R. 878-79.)

Matrix does not appeal the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss.
3
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The trial court heard argument on these motions on January 17, 2007. (R.
800:l-44.)2 On April 16, 2007, the court entered its judgment as well as its orders
granting Innerlight's Motions for Summary Judgment, striking Portions of
Anthony Catinella's Affidavit, and denying both of Matrix's Motions. (R. 877,
879.) Copies of these Judgments and Orders are Attached as Addendum A.
Matrix appeals only portions of the trial court's rulings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The trial court stated (R. 887), and Matrix has conceded {see Matrix's Appellate
Brief, p. 14) that the material facts are not in dispute. The parties executed an
"Exclusive Distributor Agreement" (the "Agreement") in October 2004, (R. 408),
a copy of which is Attached as Addendum B. Matrix agreed to appoint Innerlight
as its exclusive distributor of Sassoon products, "all in accordance with and
pursuant to the terms and conditions" of the Agreement See id. Under the
Agreement "the acceptance of this appointment by [Innerlight] is conditioned
upon [Innerlight's] written acceptance of [Matrix's] Product Price List which shall
not be subject to change until October 17, 2006" (the "condition precedent"). See
Addendum B, f 2(b). Matrix did not supply Innerlight with a Product Price List.
(R. 180-81, 880.) Innerlight did not provide a written acceptance of a Product
Price List. (R. 180-81, 880.) The Agreement further stated that Matrix—not
Innerlight—had the right to "require" Beverly Sassoon to make appearances, and
2

The transcript of these proceedings appears in the Record Index as R. 800.
Innerlight's reference to material within the transcript will begin with the record
cite "R. 800" followed by the cited pages.
4
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it offered to cause Ms. Sassoon to appear at Innerlight functions up to four times
per year. See id.,]A.

In October 2004, before the Agreement was signed, Matrix

caused Beverly Sassoon to attend an Innerlight function, an action that Matrix
duplicated later in March 2005. (R. 717.)
In the event that the condition precedent was satisfied, Innerlight agreed to
pay Matrix $750,000.00 for Sassoon products during the first effective year of the
resulting contract, $1.5 million dollars during the next twelve month period, and at
least $4 million dollars during each subsequent twelve month period thereafter,
with the required purchases and payments being received by Matrix in quarterly
allotments. See id., f 5 (a)-(c). Finally, the Agreement stated:
[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not
be amended or modified except by written instrument signed
by each of the parties hereto. . . . No party shall be
construed as having waived any of its rights hereunder or to
insist upon strict compliance by any other party with its
obligations hereunder, nor any custom or practice of the
parties at variance with the terms hereof, shall constitute a
waiver of any party's right to demand exact compliance with
the terms hereof. . . . No representations, inducements,
promises or agreements, oral or otherwise, between the
parties not embodied herein or incorporated herein by
reference shall be of any force or effect.

Id,] 12.
Innerlight made a one-time order to Matrix for five Sassoon products on
October 11, 2004. (R. 181 (Tate Affidavit) Attached hereto as Addendum C.)
Innerlight issued a separate purchase order for each of the five products, which
had a value of approximately $250,000.00. (R. 180-82.) Innerlight's purchase
5
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order stated that the order was not made subject to any terms, and no reference to
the Agreement was made. See id. Innerlight received the ordered product and
paid the invoices. (R. 880.) Innerlight's payment was the only payment Innerlight
made to Matrix. (R. 880.) Innerlight never placed a second order for any
cosmetic product with Matrix. (R. 180-81, 880.)
After certain efforts to market the Sassoon product, having never received a
Product Price List from Matrix, Innerlight informed its distributors that they
should discontinue efforts to sell the product, and informed Matrix that their
efforts to form a contract had failed. (R. 402 (Catinella Affidavit).) Innerlight
then filed its action seeking a declaration that the Agreement was unenforceable.
(R. 13,881.)
The trial court determined that the condition precedent had not been
satisfied, rendering the Agreement ineffective and unenforceable. (R. 877-97.)
Matrix now appeals.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's summary judgment rulings should be affirmed (and
Matrix's arguments on appeal fail) on multiple, alternative grounds.
First, Matrix fails to challenge trial court rulings that supply alternative
bases for the court's summary judgment decision. Because of Matrix's failure,
these rulings are deemed established, and are fatal to Matrix's appeal. Among
these unchallenged rulings are the following: that the parties' executory agreement
fell within the ambit of Utah's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") and
6
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Innerlight's purchase order was insufficient under the UCC to satisfy the
Agreement's condition precedent; that Innerlight's purchase order at most
constituted a one-time contract that had been satisfied; that under the UCC and the
terms of the parties' Agreement, no "course of performance" was permitted to
alter, modify, or void provisions of the executory agreement; that under the UCC's
statute of frauds for the sale of goods (Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-201(l)), the
purchase orders could not establish pricing for an overall, enforceable contract;
that the UCC barred Matrix's waiver argument, but even if it did not, Innerlight
timely revoked any waiver in writing; that Matrix failed to preserve the affirmative
defense of "ratification" and thus waived the right to assert it; that Matrix's
estoppel theory was barred under the terms of the UCC, and particularly section
70A-2-208 and the UCC's statute of frauds; and that the Agreement was not an
enforceable contract under UCC § 70A-2-305(4) because the parties did not intend
to be bound by contract absent agreed upon fixed pricing, and no fixed pricing was
agreed to. (R. 877-96; see Addendum A.)
Matrix does not challenge or brief these and other trial court rulings.
Matrix fails even to acknowledge that the trial court made these rulings, opting
instead to reargue select portions of claims as if the trial court's alternative rulings
did not exist. However, each trial court ruling that Matrix has failed to challenge
and brief should now be considered established and binding on appeal. And these
unchallenged rulings independently establish the trial court's summary judgment
decisions and preclude Matrix's arguments on appeal.
7
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Second, even if this Court chose to consider the merits of Matrix's
arguments (and it need not address them), the outcome is unchanged.
A,

The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Matrix's "Fulfillment"
Theory.

First, Matrix failed to satisfy its obligation under the condition precedent;
Matrix never produced the required Product Price List, and Innerlight supplied no
written acceptance of a Matrix company price list required under the Agreement to
meet the condition. Second, Matrix's evidence of fulfillment (Matrix's "12
actions") is barred from consideration at trial and on appeal under the Agreement
and UCC, as unchallenged trial court rulings confirm. Third, and alternatively, the
Agreement's integration clause (Agreement If 12) precludes Matrix's argument
under the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT
20, *| 11, — P.3d— (quoting Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d
1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)), because Matrix's theory is incorrectly dependant on
alleged pre-Agreement oral understandings on price, information beyond the
Agreement's four corners. Fourth, even if the Agreement's integration term did
not preclude Matrix's "evidence" (and it does), Matrix had no admissible evidence
of an alleged oral understanding on pricing. Based on Innerlight's unopposed
motion to strike regarding the third Affidavit of Matrix's Anthony Catinella, the
trial court struck from consideration the portions of the affidavit on which Matrix
depends for its evidence. Fifth, the Innerlight purchase orders to which Matrix
cites were ruled insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an "acceptance" for
8
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overall contract pricing. Matrix does not challenge these rulings on appeal. Thus,
any claim of error is deemed abandoned.
B.

The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Matrix's "Ratification"
Theory.

First, as with Matrix's fulfillment theory, Matrix's failure to challenge
dispositive trial court rulings precludes Matrix's ratification claim. Second, the
trial court correctly ruled that "ratification" is an affirmative defense that Matrix
failed to plead and preserve under rule 12(h), Utah R. Civ. P. This unchallenged
ruling should now be deemed established. Third, no "ratification" occurred
sufficient to excuse or satisfy the condition precedent of paragraph 2(b) because
Matrix's ratification evidence is precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings.
Fourth, for Innerlight to have "ratified" the Agreement as Matrix suggests,
Innerlight had to confirm its "acceptance" of the enforceability of the Agreement
by fully performing under its terms through, among other points of performance,
making mandatory quarterly payments and purchases. See Addendum B, f 5.
However, Innerlight undisputedly did not make these payments. Fourth, even if
Innerlight were found to have "ratified" the Agreement under Matrix's theory and
is deemed to have accepted all terms of the Agreement, those terms still include
the express condition precedent of paragraph 2(b). There is no other "contract"
and Matrix cannot selectively delete terms it dislikes. Because the condition of
paragraph 2(b) was unfulfilled, the Agreement did not become an enforceable
contract in all events.
9
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C.

Innerlight Did Not Waive Contract Rights

The trial court correctly concluded that Innerlight had not waived its right to
demand strict compliance with the terms of the Agreement. First, Matrix's waiver theory
is precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings that Matrix's evidence on waiver is
precluded from consideration under Agreement paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 (R. 88790); that Innerlight could not waive rights under the Agreement without an express
written Innerlight waiver and Innerlight provided no written waiver; and that even if
Matrix could establish waiver, Innerlight properly revoked the waiver under UCC § 2209(5). Because Matrix assigns no error on appeal regarding these rulings and does not
brief them, any claim concerning them is waived. Second, even if Matrix's waiver theory
were not precluded as shown above (and it is), Matrix failed as a matter of law to
establish that Innerlight "distinctly" and "unequivocally" waived its rights under the
Agreement; Matrix could not meet the high standard of proof for such claims.
D.

The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Matrix's Estoppel Claim

The trial court's ruling on summary judgment, rejecting Matrix's estoppel
theory should be affirmed on multiple alternative grounds. First, Matrix's
estoppel theory is precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings that Matrix's
evidence on estoppel (Matrix's same "twelve actions") is precluded from
consideration under Agreement paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208. Second, even if
Matrix's estoppel theory could be addressed on the merits on appeal, it fails as a
matter of law because Matrix adduced no evidence that it relied on Innerlight's
conduct. Third, even if Matrix had adduced evidence of reliance on Innerlight's
conduct (and it did not), the trial court ruled that Matrix's reliance would have
10
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been unreasonable as a matter of law. Matrix does not challenge this ruling.
Finally, Matrix may not invoke equity here and ask this Court to overlook
Matrix's failure and to deprive Innerlight of its agreed-to rights under the
Agreement based on a situation Matrix created through its own failure.
E.

The Trial Court's Rulings on Motions to Strike Should be
Affirmed

The Court should reject Matrix's challenge of the trial court's affidavit rulings,
first, because Matrix failed on appeal to comply with rule 24, Utah R. App. P.; Matrix
fails to explain the alleged error of the trial court, or to demonstrate the nature of the error
with applicable authority. Second, the trial court exercised proper discretion in admitting
Wesley Tate's Affidavit. Matrix does not question that Innerlight received the
complaints Matrix challenges, that Tate's statements are the product of his personal
knowledge or that courts regularly admit the content of customer complaints when the
complaints merely support their existence. Third, the trial court's ruling, striking
portions to Catinella's Third Affidavit, was also correct because Innerlight's Motion to
Strike was unopposed, and because Catinella's affidavit was untimely. Finally, the
challenged sections of Catinella's affidavit were properly stricken because they consisted
of inadmissible content, and because the integration clause of Agreement precluded the
offending sections.
Consequently, this Court should reject each of Matrix's arguments on
appeal and affirm the trial court's rulings.

11
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED INNERLIGHT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DECLARED THE PARTIES'
EXECUTORY AGREEMENT UNENFORCEABLE3
The trial court's grant of summary judgment for Innerlight, and its denial of

Matrix's similar motion, was proper, supported by the record, and mandated by
the parties' executory agreement. The trial court's order rested on multiple,
alternative rulings. (R. 877-97.) But Matrix does not challenge on appeal
multiple, alternative trial court rulings which support the court's summary
judgment ruling. Matrix has thus waived any claim of error as to those rulings.
This is fatal to Matrix's appeal. But even if Matrix's appeal were not precluded by
this failure (and it is), Matrix's claims were correctly resolved on the merits by the
trial court, which correctly applied the law to the undisputed facts, as shown
below. "In deciding whether summary judgment was appropriate, [this court]
need review only whether the trial court erred in applying the relevant law and
whether a material fact was in dispute." WebBank v. Am. Gen. Annuity Serv.
Corp., 2002 UT 88, ] 10, 54 P.3d 1139.

3

The trial court also concluded that judgment for Matrix was precluded by
disputed material facts. (R. 882.) Matrix does not challenge this ruling or offer
any substantive argument or briefing that would suggest that the trial court erred in
its conclusion. In failing to mount a challenge to the trial court's conclusion on
this issue, Matrix has waived any right to assert a claim of error. See Rukivina v.
Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah 1997) (declining to address
certain trial court rulings because the appellant failed to "specifically brief, argue,
or offer evidence in support" of a challenge to the ruling).
12
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A.

The Court Should Affirm The Trial Court's Conclusion That
The Condition Precedent Was Unsatisfied, Rendering The
Parties 9 Agreement Unenforceable.4
1.

The Summary judgment Order Should be Affirmed because
Matrix Does Not Challenge Dispositive Trial Court Rulings.

The trial court's summary judgment ruling should be affirmed because
Matrix has failed to challenge on appeal the trial court's alternative grounds for
summary judgment which now defeat Matrix's arguments on appeal. The trial
court's order is comprehensive and was based on multiple, alternative grounds.
(R. 877-971.) Each ruling that Matrix has failed to challenge on appeal is
considered waived and abandoned by Matrix. See Am. Towers Owners Assoc,
Inc. v. CCIMech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 n. 5 (Utah 1996) ("Issues not briefed
by an appellant are deemed waived and abandoned."); Caroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT
App 339,fflj18-20, 79 P.3d 974 (discussing the minimum standards necessary to
challenge a trial court's ruling and avoid abandoning any claim of error). See also
Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988 P.2d 1 (stating that the appellant
"has waived any challenge to this ruling by failing to raise, brief, or argue the

4

Matrix's assertion that the trial court erred in ruling that the condition precedent
was not satisfied violates Utah R. App. P. 24, which requires an appealing party to
cite this Court to authority supporting the position taken, and to develop that
authority into a reasoned analysis of the issue sufficient to provide this Court with
a foundation to address the arguments presented. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9);
State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ 13, 99 P.3d 820. Failure to comply with rule
24(a)(9) impermissibly shifts the burden of research and argument to this Court.
See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Matrix cites no relevant
authority on this issue, merely offering the Court a limited, unsupported argument.
Accordingly, Matrix's failure should result in this Court rejecting Matrix's
argument on this issue.
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issue"). A simple reference to the entire summary judgment, "by itself, certainly
does not constitute the analysis required to sustain" an appeal of all of the issues
contained in the summary judgment decision. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, f 18,
(discussing the abandonment of issues on appeal in the context of a motion to
dismiss).
The alternative grounds not challenged by Matrix (now considered
established) dispose of Matrix's appeal. These grounds include the following: (1)
that the meaning and interpretation of the parties' Agreement are controlled by
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") (R. 882-94); (2) that, under the UCC
(Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-101 to -807 (2007)), Matrix could not resort to evidence
not contemplated under the plain language of the Agreement (R. 884); (3) that
under UCC §§70A-2-202 and 70A-2-208, Matrix is precluded from advancing
evidence of any alleged prior agreements to vary the terms of the Agreement, and
that Matrix could not attempt to assert a "course-of-performance" argument
(related to Innerlight's submission of a purchase order and associated activities) in
an effort to bypass the express condition precedent (R. 885-86); (4) that Matrix
was barred under UCC 70A-2-201(l) (the statute of frauds for sales of goods)
from asserting that Innerlight's one-time purchase-order price somehow
established pricing for a multi-year, overall contract, bypassing the express
condition precedent (R. 886-87); (5) that even if the Innerlight purchase order
could have been considered by the court, UCC 70A-2-201(l) rendered the
purchase order itself a contract just as to the quantity of goods ordered; thus, the
14
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purchase order could not establish that the condition precedent had been satisfied
to create an overall enforceable contract (R. 884, 886); (6) that under the UCC,
even if Innerlight's action could have established a waiver of the condition
precedent, Innerlight timely revoked its waiver, reviving the Agreement's
provisions (R. 889); (7) that ratification, one of Matrix's theories on appeal, is an
affirmative defense that Matrix failed to plead and thus waived (R. 890-91); and
(8) that under Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-305(4), the parties did not intend to be
bound unless the price be fixed or agreed, and it was not fixed or agreed; thus,
there is no contract (R. 882-83, 895.) Because this condition was not satisfied, "no
overall contract exists under the UCC." (R. 896.)
In sum, Matrix assigns no error on appeal to any of these alternative rulings
or to key facts identified in the summary judgment order. Indeed, Matrix omits
even to inform this Court that the summary judgment order includes these rulings,
and omits to append the order to its brief, as Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1)(C)
requires. By failing to challenge and brief these rulings, Matrix has waived any
right to assign error to them, and has in effect conceded that the rulings are
correct, as shown above.5
5

Innerlight will not brief the underlying bases of the unchallenged trial court
rulings here. And by bringing Matrix's waiver to the court's attention, Innerlight,
as Appellee, does not "raise a new matter" that would entitle the Matrix now to
brief the issue in its reply brief. See, e.g., State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60, f 21, 6
P.3d 1116; State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, n. 3, 57 P.3d 1139. See also Eddy
v. Albertson 's Inc., 2001 UT 88,121, 34 P.3d 781 (quoting Coleman v. Stevens,
2000 UT 98, If 9, 17 P.3d 1122) ("[i]t is well established that [this court] 'will not
consider matters raised for the first time in the reply brief").
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Matrix is thus bound by these rulings which cause Matrix's arguments on
appeal to fail Ignoring most of the trial court rulings, Matrix selectively argues on
appeal only that (1) Innerlight fulfilled the condition precedent itself (Matrix
appeal point "II"); (2) Innerlight waived or excused the condition precedent
(Matrix point "III"); (3) Innerlight ratified the Agreement (Matrix point "IV"); and
(4) Innerlight is estopped from denying an enforceable agreement (Matrix point
"V"). But each Matrix argument is fatally dependant on Matrix's "evidence" that
the trial court ruled was precluded by the Agreement and the UCC, as shown
above. (R. 885-92.) Matrix does not challenge this. And each Matrix argument
depends on pricing from the Innerlight purchase orders which the trial court ruled
was barred by UCC §2-201(1). (R. 887.) Matrix does not challenge this. Each
argument is also contradicted by the trial court's unchallenged ruling that no
enforceable contract existed under UCC §2-305(4). (R. 895-96.) This ruling, too,
goes unchallenged on appeal. In sum, each Matrix argument fails on appeal under
the unchallenged summary judgment rulings (and other unchallenged rulings are
identified below as Matrix's individual claims are addressed). These trial court
rulings are now established as correct. The Court's analysis may end here.
2.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Condition
Precedent was Unsatisfied and that no Enforceable Contract
Arose.

Even if the unchallenged trial court rulings did not defeat Matrix's
remaining theories on appeal (and they do), the trial court correctly determined
that Matrix's arguments fail as a matter of law.
16
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Interpretation of the parties' executory Agreement requires analysis of the
Agreement's language, because courts "'"look to the writing itself to ascertain the
parties' intentions, and [this Court] considers] each contract provision . . . in
relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring
none.'"" WebBank, 2002 UT 88, \ 18 (citations omitted). "Utilizing ordinary
rules of contract construction, if a contract's terms are clear and unambiguous, the
court must construe the writing according to its plain and ordinary meaning."
ELM, Inc. v. M.T. Enters., Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also
Tom Heal Commercial Real Estate, Inc. v. York, 2007 UT App 265, If 9, 167 P.3d
523.
Paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement (confirmed by paragraph 2(a)) is the
critical provision in this dispute:
(a)
Subject to the terms and provisions set forth in
this Agreement, [Matrix] hereby appoints [Innerlight] as
the exclusive distributor of the Products . . . .
(b)
The acceptance of this appointment by
[Innerlight] is conditioned upon [Innerlight's] written
acceptance of [Matrix's] Product Price List which shall not
be subject to change until October 17, 2006.
Addendum B, Yll 2(a)(b). Matrix concedes that paragraph 2(b) creates a condition
precedent. "Courts must respect express conditions precedent." Commercial
Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This Court
addressed the proper respect to be given to conditions precedent:
[generally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the court has
any right to ignore or modify conditions which are clearly
17
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expressed merely because it may subject on of the parties to
hardship, but they must be enforced uin accordance with the
intentions as . . . manifested by the language used by the
parties to the contract."
Id. (quoting Jones v. Acme Bldg. Prods, Inc., 22 Utah 2d 202, 450 P.2d 743, 746
(1969)). Where a condition precedent, like the express condition of paragraph
2(b), remains unfulfilled, the obligor under a signed agreement has in essence no
enforceable contract and no duty to perform. The Cantamar, L.L.C. v.
Champagne, 2006 UT App 321,1J16, 142 P.3d 140 ("failure of a material
condition precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform"), quoting Harper
v. Great Salt Lake Council, Inc., 1999 UT 34 (citing 3A Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin
on Contracts § 630, at 20-21). This principle of law has applied to a purchase
agreement even where money was exchanged. See Harper, 1999 UT 34, <[fl4.
Here, the condition precedent expresses the intent of the parties. First, it
confirms that the parties had not agreed on fixed pricing terms necessary to form
an enforceable contract. Matrix conditioned its appointment of Innerlight as
distributor, and Innerlight "conditioned" its acceptance of an appointment, on
Innerlight's written acceptance of a fixed Matrix Product Price List. Addendum
B, YI 2(a)(b). Matrix was to supply a Product Price List. Innerlight was able to
evaluate the Product Price List and, if found acceptable, was to accept it in
writing. Addendum B, Tf2(b). But the list never came, and Innerlight's "written
acceptance" was never made. (R. 880.) Without the prerequisite acceptance, the
Agreement was an unenforceable executory contract, and Innerlight's duties and
18
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obligations under the overall Agreement also remained unenforceable. The
Cantamar, 2006 UT App 321, <f 16; see also Brownsville Advanced Med. Imaging,
L.P., v. Capitalwerks, LLC, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6360, (Tex. App. Corpus
Christi [13th Dist.] 2005)(unpublished opinion) (based on unmet conditions, the
court denied a motion to dismiss grounded on a forum-selection clause,
concluding: "Brownsville Imaging was not bound by the terms of an executory
contract, much less by a forum selection clause within the same executory
instrument."). The trial court properly granted Innerlight Summary Judgment on
this issue.
3.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Condition
Precedent was not "Fulfilled."

Recognizing that it supplied no company price list, a condition that
Innerlight mandated in writing under paragraph 2(b), Matrix asks this Court to
ignore the intent and expectations of the parties expressed in the Agreement, and
to conclude that Innerlight satisfied the condition precedent for an overall contract
on its own through Innerlight's limited-quantity, one-time purchase orders.
Matrix's argument fails for several alternative reasons.
First, Matrix's failure to challenge dispositive trial court rulings dooms
Matrix's theory, as shown above. Matrix's "fulfillment" theory is fatally
dependant on "evidence" precluded by contract and the UCC pursuant to the

6

Again, Matrix's entire argument should be rejected because it fails to comply
with rule 24 Utah R. App. P. Matrix makes no effort to supply this Court with
substantive authority and to apply it.
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unchallenged trial court rulings; it is precluded by the unchallenged rulings that
bar the use of purchase order pricing under the statute of frauds of UCC §2202(1); and it collides with the trial court's unchallenged no-contract ruling under
UCC §2-305(4). See pp. 13-15 supra. Matrix's "fulfillment" argument ends here.
Second, and alternatively, the Agreement's integration clause precludes
Matrix's argument under the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in Tangren v.
Tangren, 2008 UT 20, <[ 11, — P.3d — (quoting Hall v. Process Instruments &
Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995)), because Matrix's theory is
dependant on alleged pre-Agreement oral understandings on price, information
beyond the Agreement's four corners. See Matrix Brief at pp. 22-33.
In the Agreement, the parties set forth that:
This agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may
not be amended or modified except by a written instrument
signed by each of the parties hereto. . . . No party shall be
construed as having waived any of its rights hereunder
unless such waiver shall be in writing signed by the party
against whom such waiver is being sought. Neither the
failure of any party to exercise any power given such party
hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by any other
party with its obligations hereunder, nor any custom or
practice of the parties at variance with the terms hereof,
shall constitute a waiver of any party's right to demand
exact-compliance with the terms hereof. . . . No
representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral
or otherwise, between the parties not embodied herein or
incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or
effect.
Addendum B, TJ 12. This integration provision eliminates any consideration
of an alleged prior agreement on pricing ("oral or otherwise"), and any reliance
20
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upon such an agreement would be an error of law. See Tangren, 2008 UT 20, f
11. "In other words, regardless of whether the parties may have had preliminary
agreements about a given subject during the course of negotiations, we will
assume that a writing dealing with the same subject was intended by the parties to
supersede any prior or contemporaneous agreements." Novell Inc.'v. The Canopy
Group, 2004 UT App 162, U 14, 92 P.3d 768. Because Matrix's argument
assumes that it produced pricing information to Innerlight prior to the execution of
the Agreement, its argument violates the parties' integration provision, which
eliminates Matrix's fulfillment theory from consideration here.
Third, even if the Agreement's integration term did not preclude Matrix's
"evidence" (and it does), Matrix had no admissible evidence of an alleged oral
understanding on pricing. Matrix cites the Catinella affidavit as its proof. See,
e.g., Matrix Brief at 20. But the trial court struck the cited portions of the
Catinella Affidavit from consideration based on Innerlight's unopposed motion to
strike. See pp. 39-41, infra.
Fourth, the Innerlight purchase orders are insufficient as a matter of law to
constitute an "acceptance" for overall contract pricing, as the trial court correctly
ruled. (R. 886.) Matrix produced no admissible evidence that it supplied a
company price list that any Innerlight purchase order could accept. And even if
there were a fixed Matrix company price list capable of acceptance, the purchase
orders on their face do not purport to "accept" anything; they place a one-time
order for a specified, limited quantity of product. (R. 887.) They do not state that
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they "accept" or approve pricing for years of purchases of unknown quantities of
product, contrary to what Matrix implies. They contain no reference to any price
list, to paragraph 2(b), or any other Agreement term. (R. 186.) Indeed, the section
of the purchase orders entitled "Terms," states that there are "none." (Id.)
The trial court also ruled that, at most, the purchase orders represented a
limited contract between Innerlight and Matrix for the purchase of a discrete
amount of product at a defined purchase price. (R. 884-87.) Because Innerlight
already paid for its one-time order, the purchase order was fully performed and
inapplicable to the Agreement. (R. 887.) Matrix does not challenge these rulings
on appeal. Thus, any claim of error is abandoned on appeal. (R. 887.) See Am.
Towers Owners Assoc, Inc., 930 P.2d at 1185 n. 5. In sum, the trial court
correctly ruled that the Innerlight purchase orders as a matter of law did not create
pricing for an overall contract. (R. 886-87.)
Fifth, conditions precedent are subject to strict rules of interpretation and
the parties are bound by the terms that they adopted in the Agreement. See
Clayton, 863 P.2d at 38. Matrix failed to produce a Product Price List, and
Innerlight supplied no written acceptance of a Matrix Product Price List. Matrix's
effort to inject precluded evidence of conduct not contemplated under the
condition precedent should be rejected, and the trial court's decision should be
affirmed.
Matrix receives no help from Monroe Inc. v. Jack Parsons Construction
Co., 604 P.2d 901 (Utah 1979), which it cites "by analogy" for the notion that
22
SLCJ80629.I

"any signed writing" (presumably even a purchase order) could meet the
requirement of paragraph 2(b) of a written acceptance. See Matrix Brief at 22.
Even if this is so, as shown above, Matrix adduced no admissible evidence that it
supplied a company price list that a purchase order could accept in writing or
otherwise, and the purchase orders, as a matter of law, do not operate as an
"acceptance" of any term or price list, as shown above. In all events, Matrix's
failure to challenge dispositive trial court rulings precludes Matrix's fulfillment
theory.
In sum, for the above alternative reasons, this Court should affirm the trial
court's ruling that the material condition precedent of paragraph 2(b) was
unsatisfied, leaving the Agreement unenforceable. (R. 883-84.)

7

Monroe is inapplicable on other levels. Unlike this case, the parties in Monroe
entered an enforceable, complete contract already containing agreed pricing. See
id. at 902. They orally agreed to modify the contract, including price terms, and
confirmed this in writing. See id. at 903. After the plaintiff folly performed under
the contract—not submitted and paid for just one order—the defendant rejected the
modified terms, arguing the oral modification was barred by the UCC and the
contract's integration and modification provisions. See id. at 904-05. The court
disagreed, holding that the letter confirming the modification, coupled with the
defendant's notice to its client, satisfied the UCC. See id. at 904-06. The court
also determined, unlike the Agreement here, that the parties' "modification"
provision was insufficient to establish the parties' intent. See id. at 904-05. The
Monroe court implied that a no-modification provision as detailed as Agreement
paragraph 12, would be enforceable. See id. Because the Agreement's paragraph
12 here (Addendum B) contains such a comprehensive no-modification provision,
under Monroe, any modification to the Agreement must be accomplished within a
single writing, signed by both parties. No such writing exists here. Further, the
purchase order made no mention of the Agreement or its terms and contains no
language suggesting that it was intended to modify the Agreement.
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B.

The Trial Court Correctly Concluded That Innerlight Did Not
Ratify The Agreement To Excuse The Condition Precedent

Matrix asserts that Innerlight ratified the contract "by reaping the contract's
benefits for a year and a half." Matrix's Brief, at p.26. And Matrix cites the same
evidence of Innerlight's one-time product purchase, its steps to promote product
and statements of Innerlight's parent company. See Matrix brief at pp. 26-31. The
trial court determination that Innerlight did not ratify the parties' Agreement
should be affirmed for multiple alternative reasons.
First, as with Matrix's fulfillment theory, Matrix's failure to challenge
dispositive trial court rulings precludes Matrix's ratification claim. Matrix's
theory is fatally reliant on the same course-of-performance "evidence" precluded
by contract and the UCC pursuant to unchallenged trial court rulings; it is
precluded by unchallenged rulings barring use of purchase order pricing under the
statute of frauds of UCC §2-202(1); and it is precluded by the trial court's
unchallenged no-contract ruling under UCC §2-305(4). See pp. 13-15, supra.
Matrix's "fulfillment" argument ends here. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988
P.2d 1 (the appellant "has waived any challenge to this ruling by failing to raise,
brief, or argue the issue").
Second, the trial court ruled that "ratification" is an affirmative defense that
Matrix failed to plead and preserve. (R. 890.) The court ruled that Matrix could
not assert the theory because it had waived it under rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. (R. 890) Matrix does not challenge this ruling on appeal (or even
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advise this Court that the ruling occurred), and has thus abandoned any claim of
error associated with the trial court ruling. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \ 21, 988
P.2d 1. Accordingly, Matrix's ratification argument may be rejected as a matter of
law.8
Third, even if Matrix's ratification claim were not otherwise'precluded (and
it is), the trial court properly concluded that no "ratification" occurred sufficient to
excuse or satisfy the condition precedent of paragraph 2(b). Ratification may be
either implied or express, see Lowe v. April Indus,, Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299
(Utah 1974), but in either case, "to be effectual, [the decision to ratify] must have
been made with a full knowledge of all material facts." Aggeller & Musser Seed
Co. v. Blood, 73 Utah 120, 272 P. 933, 936 (1928). In its attempt to establish a
ratification, Matrix again advances the same course-of-performance evidence
(precluded by unchallenged trial court rulings (R. 890-92)), saying Innerlight was
"acting on the contract for more than a year and a half by signing the Agreement,
placing one order of 5 products, posting a price list for resale on its web site,
allowing Matrix to invite Beverly Sassoon to two events, and forward-looking
statements of an Innerlight parent company. See Matrix Brief at 27-28.9 But

8

In an abundance of caution, Innerlight addresses Matrix's ratification argument
on appeal. However, Innerlight maintains that the argument presented cannot
affect the outcome of the appeal due to Matrix's tacit acceptance of the trial
court's ruling. See Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, ^ 54, 48 P.3d 895.

9

Matrix also devotes pages to conjecture (without authority), asserting, for
example, that Innerlight's "parent company" "took several legally operative and
significant steps" by filing required 8Q and 10K forms (but never explaining what
25
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Matrix ignores the legal reality that for Innerlight to have "ratified" the
Agreement, Innerlight had to confirm its "acceptance" of the enforceability of the
Agreement by fully performing under its terms through, among other points of
performance, making mandatory quarterly payments and purchases. See
Addendum B, ^ 5. Thus, had Innerlight performed for "a year and a half," as
Matrix implies, Innerlight would have made required payments to Matrix of at
least $750,000 just during the first year of the Agreement. See id. During the
second year, Innerlight would have paid $1.5 million for products. See id.
However, it is undisputed that Innerlight did not make these payments, submitting
and purchasing instead just one order just after the execution of the Agreement.
(R. 880-881.) Matrix's selective view on performance under the Agreement falls
short of the proof required for ratification. See, e.g., Yturria v. Kerr-McGee Oil &
Gas Onshore, LP, No. 7:05-cv-181, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80942, *49 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 6, 2006) (noting that the elements of ratification are (1) "approval by act,

was legally operative or why it matters) (Matrix Brief at 28 (emphasis supplied));
saying that it uis inconceivable" that a public company (Quigley, not Innerlight)
would announce that Innerlight was selling Sassoon products if Quigley thought
Innerlight had no contract (overlooking that it is typical of parties in UCC 2305(4) cases to begin performing—even to the point of buying and selling product-before the price dispute surfaced, (see R. 895-96); and saying that Innerlight
would have no right to utilize Beverly Sassoon if there were no overall contract
(overlooking that Matrix, in fact, arranged the first Sassoon visit even before the
Agreement was signed, and that Matrix could refuse to produce Ms. Sassoon, and
could even refuse to ship product, until Matrix had supplied a company price list
and received Innerlight's written acceptance). (Matrix Brief 29; Agreement *j[
2(b)).
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word, or conduct; (2) with full knowledge of the facts of the earlier act; and (3)
with the intention of giving validity to the earlier act").
Swan Creek Village Homeowners Association v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134
P.3d 1122, does not change this. There, the court ruled that the authority of a
home owners association had been ratified by its membership based "on the fact
that the [association] has acted as a valid association for almost twenty years,
during which time the lot owners have collectively accepted its management." Id.
at f 38 (emphasis supplied). The differences between Warne and this case are
stark. Unlike the association membership in Warne, Innerlight did not accept or
meet the performance requirements of the Agreement (i.e., it did not attempt to
make required payments). (R. 880.) Further, Innerlight made a single purchase
based on prices it proposed. (R. 880.) And most importantly, Innerlight did not
submit dozens of orders or routinely perform any other duty for almost "twenty
years." Warne, 2006 UT 22, 134 P.3d 1122, f 38. As a matter of law, even if
Matrix had preserved a ratification claim, and its evidence were not barred (R.
890-92), Innerlight's conduct does not suggest that it intended to ratify the
Agreement.
Fourth, even if Innerlight were found to have "ratified" the Agreement,
Matrix is, in effect, asserting that Innerlight accepted the terms of the Agreement
which still include the express condition precedent of paragraph 2(b). There is no
other "contract" and Matrix cannot selectively cull out terms it dislikes, as the trial
court correctly ruled. (R. 891.) Thus, even if accepted, Matrix's argument results
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only in a determination that Innerlight agreed to the terms of the executory
agreement, an agreement that never became an enforceable contract due to the
failure of the condition precedent. See Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Quigley,
899 P.2d 766, 775 (Utah 1995) (Zimmerman, J. concurring and dissenting)
(stating that the executory agreement, even it ratified, ucontemplate[d] a separate
writing"). Matrix's ratification theory ends where it began.
For the above alternative reasons, the trial court's ruling, denying Matrix's
ratification claim on summary judgment, should be affirmed.
C

Innerlight Did Not Waive its Right to Insist Upon Strict
Compliance With the Terms of the Executory Agreement

The trial court correctly concluded that Innerlight had not waived its right
to demand strict compliance with the terms of the Agreement and that it had not
somehow abrogated the plain language of the Agreement through its actions. Like
Matrix's fulfillment and ratification theories, Matrix's waiver claim fails on
multiple alternative grounds.
First, Matrix's waiver theory is precluded by unchallenged trial court
rulings that: (a) Matrix's evidence on waiver (Matrix's "twelve undisputed
actions" (Matrix Brief at 24-25)) is precluded from consideration under
Agreement paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 (R. 887-90); (b) Innerlight could not
waive rights under the Agreement without an express written Innerlight waiver,
and Innerlight provided no written waiver (R. 881, 887); (c) even if Matrix could
have shown an Innerlight waiver under paragraph 2(b), Innerlight properly
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revoked the waiver under UCC § 2-209(5) (R. 889); (d) Matrix's attempted use of
purchase order pricing to create an overall contract is barred under the statute of
frauds of UCC §2-201(1) (R. 889); and (e) the parties had no "contract" under
UCC §2-305(4) (R. 895-96). Because Matrix assigns no error on appeal regarding
these rulings and does not brief them, any claim concerning them is waived.
Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, ^j 21 (the appellant "has waived any challenge to this
ruling by failing to raise, brief, or argue the issue"). The trial court's unchallenged
rulings defeat Matrix's waiver theory. The Court's analysis may end here.
Second, even if Matrix's waiver theory were not precluded as shown above
(and it is), Matrix failed as a matter of law to establish that Innerlight "distinctly"
and "unequivocally" waived its rights under the Agreement. The parties agreed
that, to be effective, a waiver must be evidenced by a signed writing, and that no
course of conduct could deprive a party of the right to insist on strict compliance
with Agreement terms. Addendum B, ^ 12. Though Matrix may dislike this
provision, courts "will not make a better contract for the parties than they have
made for themselves," and that courts will refuse to "avoid the contract's plain
language to achieve an 'equitable' result." Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel,
2002 UT 62, *! 19; see also Fair bourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Housing Partners,
Inc., 2003 UT App 98, n.l, 68 P.3d 1038 (refusing to read terms into or out of a
contract, when the parties had negotiated the contract and agreed upon the terms).
Matrix attempts to deal with the "anti-waiver" provisions of paragraph 12
saying, conveniently, that Innerlight waived them too. See Matrix Brief at 24.
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According to Matrix, the same "laundry list" of evidence somehow mixed to
waive the agreed-to anti-waiver provision. Id. But wavier of an anti-waiver
clause should only occur when the parties conduct is "so pervasive" as to waive
the clause. Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Shelton, 645 F.2d 869, 874 (10th Cir.
1981) (denying summary judgment on claim that waiver had been made because
the conduct was not "so pervasive"); see also United Vaccines, Inc. v. Diamond
Animal Health, Inc., No. 05-C-604-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39056, at *34-35
(D. Wis. June 12, 2006) (finding no evidence that the party intended to waive a
"waivers-must-be-in-writing" clause); General Grocer Co. v. Bachar, 51 111. App.
- j a y u / , yiz (III: App. Ct. 1977) (declining to interpret plaintiffs conduct in
accepting tardy payments "whether such instances are many or few" as waiving
contract rights where anti-waiver clause required written waiver); PC Com v.
Proteon, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1125, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) {citing 1 WHITE AND
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

4th Ed. § § 1-6, p. 41-42).10 Cf. Van

Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365, 1374 (Ind.App.1980) ("[T]he bank's conduct
in accepting fifty-seven past due payments and thirty-seven delinquent payments
spoke louder than its word. The trial court was adequately justified to conclude
that the bank had waived timely payments.").

10

"Remember the parties may . . . provide that no waiver shall bind unless in
writing. This clause itself may be waived, but courts should be slow to find waiver
of anti-waiver provisions. When parties agree in writing that no waiver or
modification shall be binding unless in writing, the one seeking a modification
should get it in writing." 1 WHITE AND SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,

4th Ed. § § 1-6, p. 41-42 (internal quotations omitted).
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Here, neither the one-time Innerlight purchase orders nor any of Matrix's
"12 actions" mentions or even hints at the language of paragraph 12 or Innerlight's
intent to waive that specific provision. There is no evidence—anywhereestablishing that Innerlight intended to relinquish its right to require a written
waiver or the right to insist on strict performance, as paragraph 12 provides.
Matrix's evidence of waiver fails as a matter of law, as the trial court correctly
ruled. (R. 888.)
But even if the anti-waiver terms of paragraph 12 did not exist, and even if
Matrix's waiver theory did not otherwise fail for the alternative reasons shown
above, Matrix still could not meet the high standard of proof for such claims. In
Utah, a waiver of contract rights is no small matter; "[a] waiver is an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. To constitute waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to
relinquish it." Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d
935, 942 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). "To constitute a waiver, these must be
an existing right, benefit, or advantage, knowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it:' Hertz v. NORDIC Ltd., Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah
1988) (emphasis supplied). To prove waiver, "one's actions or conduct must be
distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and
must be inconsistent with any other intent." Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432
(Utah 1983) (emphasis supplied). A "waiver [will ] not be tound trom any
particular set of facts unless clearly intended." Soter's Inc, 857 P.2d at 940.
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Under these standards, Matrix does not, and cannot, identify where
Innerlight "clearly" manifested its intent to waive the anti-waiver terms of
paragraph 12, much less its right to accept an agreed price list in writing before
agreeing to be bound to an overall contract. The only direct proof of Innerlight's
intent came from Innerlight. See (R. 188) (Innerlight's COO confirming that:
"Innerlight has never intended to waive its rights under the Agreement"). Matrix,
by contrast, spreads out and mixes various documents and statements (Matrix's
"12 actions") and asks this Court to divine Innerlight's intent. See Matrix Brief at
26. But upon scrutiny, the cited "actions" really involve only 4 facts, not 12, and
none refers to or deals with paragraph 2(b) or otherwise "clearly" establishes
Innerlight's intent to waive anything. In brief, the actions implicated in Matrix's
argument include: (1) Innerlight's one-time order (which Matrix breaks out into
multiple "facts" (the order, invoice and payment) as though they were multiple
orders); (2) Ms. Beverly Sassoon's appearance (which Matrix dices into detailed
sub-facts (i.e., flight plan, hotel, etc.), and which was first arranged before
Innerlight entered the Agreement or made any order, and which Matrix could have
denied until the condition of paragraph 2(b) was met); (3) statements issued by
Quigley Corporation (which Matrix again breaks into sub-facts); and (4)
information posted on Innerlight's web site (broken out again by Matrix to create
multiple "facts"). See Matrix Brief at 24-26.
Matrix's "12 actions" do not approach the demanding "distinctly-made"
standard necessary to demonstrate that Innerlight intended to relinquish a right, as
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required in Utah. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 312
(1936) (cited approvingly in Soter's* 857 P.2d at 942). The Utah Supreme Court
defined "distinctly" as "not confusedly, without a blending or merging of one
thing with another, clearly, obviously, unequivocally, decidedly." Soter's, 857
P.2d at 941 (citations omitted). Matrix's "12 actions" fail on all levels to show
"distinctly," "without blending," and "clearly" that Innerlight intended to
relinquish its entitlement to insist on precise performance under paragraphs 2(b)
and 12 of the Agreement. Even in the light most favorable to Matrix, as a matter
of law, this evidence creates no waiver of Innerlight's rights under paragraph 2(b),
as the trial court correctly ruled. (R. 888-89.) See Parks v. Zions First Nat'I Bank,
673 P.2d 590, 605 (Utah 1983) (finding no waiver of a right to an estate even
though party acquiesced in distribution of the estate and made no claims thereon
for three years); Pencro Assocs. v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., No. 04-2549-JWL, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31117, at * 38 (W.D. Kansas May 15, 2006) (holding that an email was not a written waiver when it did not specifically discuss the term sought
to be waived); see also Vandalia P'ship. v. JLTMobil Bldg. Ltd P'ship., No. C399-1723, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 403, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. April 25, 2000)
(holding that a letter did not waive a late-fees provision in a lease when it did not
specifically mention late fees).
Finally, even if Matrix could show—under any combination of facts-that
Innerlight specifically and unequivocally intended to waive paragraphs 2(b) ami
12 of the Agreement (and it cannot), the trial court ruled that Innerlight revoked
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any waiver. (R. 889.) Matrix does not challenge, brief, or even acknowledge this
ruling and it is therefore deemed established. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, T{ 21.
In sum, based on any or all of these alternative grounds, Matrix's waiver
theory fails as a matter of law.
D.

Matrix's Estoppel Claim is Precluded and Fails for Lack of
Evidence of Reliance on Innerlight Conduct

The trial court rejected Matrix's effort to bypass the condition precedent of
paragraph 2(b) under an estoppel theory. This ruling may be affirmed on multiple
alternative grounds.
First, Matrix's estoppel theory is precluded by unchallenged trial court
rulings that: (a) Matrix's evidence on estoppel (Matrix's same "twelve actions"
(Matrix Brief at 32)) is precluded from consideration under Agreement paragraph
12 and UCC § 2-208 (R. 887-90); (b) even if Matrix had evidence of reliance on
any of Innerlight's conduct, Matrix's reliance would be unreasonable as a matter
of law (R. 893); (c) Matrix's attempted use of purchase order pricing to create an
overall contract under an estoppel theory is barred under the statute of frauds of
UCC §2-201(1); and (d) the parties had no "contract" under UCC §2-305(4).
Because Matrix assigns no error on appeal to these rulings, and does not brief
them, any claim concerning them is waived. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, % 21;
Rukavina v. Triatlantic Ventures, Inc., 931 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Utah 1997) (holding
that issues not specifically raised and argued are deemed abandoned). This signals
an end to Matrix's estoppel theory on appeal.
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Second, even if Matrix's estoppel theory were not precluded and could be
addressed on the merits on appeal, it fails as a matter of law because Matrix
adduced no evidence that it relied on Innerlight's conduct or actions. '"The
elements of equitable estoppel are: "conduct by one party which leads another
party, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or
damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate his conduct.'"" Hertz v.
NORDIC Ltd., Inc., 761 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted,
emphasis supplied). It is a "doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their
rights where their actions or conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert
those rights." Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983).
The trial court correctly rejected Matrix's estoppel claim, ruling that Matrix
presented no evidence that it had relied upon any of Innerlight's actions or conduct
to its detriment. (R. 892-94.) Matrix confirms this on appeal; while it alleges that
"Innerlight's conduct... led Matrix, in reliance thereon, to adopt a course of
action" (Matrix Brief at 32), Matrix cites no evidence to support this assertion. Id.
And no evidence exists. None of Matrix's affidavits alleges reliance on
Innerlight's actions. And it is insufficient to allege, as Matrix does, that "[b]y
granting the exclusive Beverly Sassoon distribution rights to Innerlight, Matrix
forwent offering the exclusive distributorship to another company." (R. 408, \ 8.)
Matrix's alleged reliance upon its own participation in the Agreement is not proof
of reliance on innerlight's "conduct," (Matrix's "12 actions"), which Matrix was
required to establish as an element of an estoppel claim. See Hertz, 761 P.2d at
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962. In sum, Matrix's failure to adduce evidence of reliance is fatal to its estoppel
theory, as the trial court correctly ruled. (R. 892).
Third, even if Matrix had adduced evidence of reliance on Innerlight's
conduct (and it did not), the trial court ruled that Matrix's reliance would have
been unreasonable as a matter of law. (R. 893.) See Wardley Corp. v. Meredith
Corp., No. 03-4021, 93 Fed. Appx. 183, 186 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 2004)
(unpublished opinion) (applying Utah law) (holding no reasonable reliance on oral
promises not to sell trademark when contract did not disallow such a sale). Matrix
does not challenge this ruling, which should result in the ruling being considered
binding. Pasquin, 1999 UT App 245, \2\.
Finally, estoppel, like ratification, is an equitable doctrine, and although
"'equity regards as done that which ought to be done' [it] does not apply to every
executory contract," but instead, "[i]t only operates in favor of a party 'who holds
the equitable right to have the act performed, as against one whom the duty of
such performance has devolved.'" WillardPease Oil & Gas Co. v. Quigley, 899
P.2d 766, 775 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). "A court in equity will generally
not assist one in extricating himself from circumstances which he has created."
Battistone v. Am. Land & Dev. Co., 607 P.2d 837, 839 (Utah 1980). "Thus the
argument that 'equity should consider performed a condition [the party seeking
equity] had the option of performing' is without merit." Utah Coal & Lumber
Restaurant, Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT 100, f 12, 40 P.3d 581
(quoting Quigley, 899 P.2d at 772).
36
SLC 180629.1

These principles of equity preclude each of Matrix's equitable theories,
including its estoppel claim. Matrix invokes equity, but does not reconcile its
failure to perform by producing a company price list that Innerlight could then
review and accept. Addendum B, f 2(b); (R. 880.) Matrix, not Innerlight, failed
to satisfy the condition precedent. Matrix cannot now ask this Court to overlook
Matrix's failure and to deprive Innerlight of its agreed-to rights under the
Agreement based on a situation Matrix created through its own failure. Equity is
not designed to permit such remedies. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001 UT
I00,1f 12.
Accordingly, based on the above multiple alternative grounds, including
Matrix's failure to challenge dispositive trial court rulings, this Court should
summarily reject Matrix's estoppel claim.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE PROPER
AND WITHIN ITS CONSIDERABLE DISCRETION
While the trial court is not the sole arbiter of admissibility, it has broad

discretion in determining whether to admit or exclude evidence, and its decisions
here on two of the parties' affidavits were solidly within the bounds of that
considerable discretion. "An affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment must set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence." Norton v.
Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
Inadmissible evidence "cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment."
D&L Supply v. SaurinU 115 P.2d 420, 420 (Utah 1989). The '"district court has
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broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will
only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of discretion.'" Chen v. Stewart, 2005
UT 68,1f 27, 123 P.3d 416 (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT
96, H 20, 989 P.2d 52).
Matrix asserts two evidentiary errors concerning the trial court's treatment
of the respective affidavits. First, it argues that the trial court erred in admitting a
portion of the affidavit of Innerlight's then Executive Vice president and Chief
Operating Officer, Wesley Tate ("Tate"). Second, Matrix asserts that the court
erred in excluding sections of the third Affidavit of Matrix's principal, Anthony
Catinella ("Catinella"). However, as shown below, the trial court's rulings should
be affirmed because Matrix's argument fails to comply with Court rules and,
alternatively, fails on the merits.
A,

Matrix's Challenge to the Trial Court's Rulings on Affidavits
Fails to Comply with Rule 24

The Court should reject Matrix's challenge of the trial court's affidavit
rulings because Matrix fails to comply with rule 24, Utah R. App. P. Under rule
24, an appellant is required to cite and apply relevant authority (see Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9)), and to cite or attach to its brief the ruling being appealed. See Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1)(C). Matrix's argument fails to satisfy either requirement. In
effect, Matrix fails to explain the alleged error of the trial court, or to demonstrate
the nature of the error with applicable authority. Instead, Matrix presents this
Court with nothing more than undeveloped argument unsupported by any
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authority that could assist in developing Matrix's claims. It is insufficient simply
for Matrix to cite rules 801 and 802, Utah R. Evid., without also presenting
authority interpreting these rules. At best, Matrix's arguments are self-serving
assertion, unsupported by any material analysis.
Matrix's argument also suffers additional deficiencies. Matrix fails to cite
where in the record the challenged orders are found, and it fails to attach a copy of
these orders to its brief. In failing to meet these basic rule 24 requirements, Matrix
has "cdump[ed] the burden of argument and research'" on this Court, which
should result in the rejection of Matrix's argument. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,
f 13, 99 P.3d 820 (citation omitted).
R,

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled on the Tate Affidavit

The trial court exercised proper discretion in admitting Wesley Tate's
Affidavit. Matrix challenged paragraph thirteen of Tate's affidavit as improper
hearsay. In paragraph thirteen Tate testified that
Following the sale of certain Sassoon products purchased
from Matrix, Innerlight received complaints from
customers including, that a facial product caused
"burning" to the customer's skin, that a lotion was
"runny," and that lotion pumps were inoperable.
(R. 191, \ 13.) Matrix does not question that Innerlight received the complaints.
And Matrix tacitly concedes that Tate's statements about the complaints are the
product of his personal knowledge and thus proper under rule 56(e). Matrix's
chief complaint instead appears to center on contextual aspects of Tate's
testimony. But Matrix fails to recognize that these contextual aspects were not
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offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted" (Utah R. Evid. 801(c)), but to
support Tate's assertion that Innerlight had "received complaints." Courts
regularly admit the content of customer complaints when the complaints merely
support their existence. See Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 346
(1 st Cir. 1998); Bowen v. Fed Express Corp., No. CA 3:98-CV-1417-R, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1697, ** 12-13 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2000).
Matrix does not question this authority. And consistent with such rulings,
the trial court properly denied Matrix's Motion to Strike.
C.

The Trial Court Correctly Struck Sections of the Late-Filed
Catinella Affidavit

The trial court's ruling, striking portions to Catinella's Third Affidavit (R.
720), was correct and should be affirmed based on alternative grounds. First, it
was proper to grant Innerlight's Motion to Strike because Matrix did not oppose it.
(R. 800: 3-4, 878).M See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 938 P.2d 282, 283 n.l (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (noting that the failure to oppose a motion before the trial court results
in the waiver of the right to challenge the decision).
Second, and alternatively, the Catinella affidavit was properly stricken
because it was untimely.

This Court recently noted that untimely affidavits and

untimely evidence are subject to exclusion "even if the results lead to a grant of

11

Matrix submitted all motions for decision without arguing against Innerlight's
motion to strike. (R. 800: 40.) Matrix filed an untimely opposition to Innerlight's
motion the day after the motion was decided. (R. 798.)
Counsel for Innerlight raised this issue before the trial court during oral
argument (R. 800: 3-4.)
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summary judgment against the party seeking its introduction." Sunridge Dev.
Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g Inc., 2008 UT App 29, n.4, 596 Utah Adv. 30. Matrix filed
Catinella's Third Affidavit as an attachment to its Reply memorandum in support
of its motion for summary judgment. (R. 720.) The affidavit, at least in part,
purported to address a new argument that Matrix first attempted to raise in its
reply memorandum after Innerlight's briefing had closed, precluding Innerlight
from responding.13 Thus, the trial court's decision to exclude portions of
Catinella's untimely affidavit was solidly within the bounds of the court's
discretion. See id.
Third, even if the challenged sections of Catinella's affidavit were not
otherwise properly stricken (and they were), they were riddled with inadmissible
material, unsuitable for consideration. Under rule 56(e), Utah R. Civ. P, an
affidavit must be based upon personal knowledge, must have an adequate
foundation in the record, must avoid conclusory statements, and must not rely
upon hearsay. See In re the Gen. Determination of Water Rights, 1999 UT 39, f^f
26-27, 982 P.2d 65; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Failure to satisfy these
requirements renders an affidavit, or at least its offending portions, inadmissible.
See Norton, 669 P.2d at 859.

Matrix raised a "practical construction" theory for the first time in its reply
memo after Innerlight's briefing had closed; consequently, the trial court ruled that
"the Court need not consider it." (R. 894.) Matrix does not challenge the trial
court's ruling on appeal.
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Catinella's Third Affidavit failed to comport with rule 56(e). Catinella
purported that Matrix and Innerlight "entered into an Exclusive Distributorship
Agreement whereby [Innerlight] was appointed as the exclusive distributor" of
certain products. (R. 721, U 3.) He also asserted that he and the principals of
Innerlight "jointly, cooperatively, and with finality agreed upon the prices at
which [Innerlight] would sell" the product. (R. 722, ^ 8.) Each of these
statements violates the requirements of rule 56(e) because they are legal
conclusions (regarding when an "agreement" is formed and how it operates) and
neither represents Catinella's personal knowledge. Rather, the statements are
better described as "factual conclusions," which are "insufficient to raise a genuine
issue of fact." Winter v. N. W. Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 1991).
The statements purport to speak to the intent of individuals not within Catinella's
control, and he has conflated his opinion of what occurred between himself and
Innerlight's principals into a legal conclusion (that the parties entered a contractual
and how that contract functioned) cloaked as a factual assertion. Thus, the trial
court properly excluded paragraphs three and eight.
Similarly, the trial court properly excluded paragraph nine and paragraphs
ten through fourteen of the affidavit. In paragraph nine, Catinella contended that
the prices Innerlight paid for its one-time order matched prices he said the parties
"agreed upon." (R. 722, \ 9.) This assertion was again not based upon Catinella's
personal knowledge, but was instead another legal conclusion concerning the onetime transaction. Such material is inadmissible because it is conclusory, purports
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to be factual but is instead legal opinion, and lacks foundation. Thus, the trial
court properly declined to consider it. Saurini, 775 P.2d at 420 (stating that it is
error to consider inadmissible evidence in a summary judgment proceeding).
In paragraphs ten through fourteen, Catinella made the same error. He
describes Innerlight as "the then-exclusive distributor . . . pursuant to the contract"
(R. 722, If 10), asserts that "because of the exclusivity given to [Innerlight] under
the contract," Matrix sold product to no other distributor (R. 722, Tf 11), and claims
that Innerlight made demands pursuant to the alleged contract. (R. 723,ffif1214.). These allegations, like others in his Affidavit, are no more than conclusions
or aspirations packaged as "facts." They are merely Catinella's opinions
concerning the nature of the parties5 executory agreement and his legal conclusion
that the agreement ripened into an enforceable contract prior to the satisfaction of
the condition precedent. At bottom, these statements are improper legal
conclusions and opinion concerning the very question lying at the heart of
Innerlight's Petition for Declaratory Judgment. Therefore, the trial court properly
struck them.
Finally, because the parties' executory agreement contained a clear
integration provision, Catinella's effort to inject an alleged prior agreement was
inadmissible as a matter of law. As the Utah Supreme Court recently stated, when
parties to a contract include a clear integration provision within their written
agreement, '"in the absence of fraud, that writing contains the whole of the
agreement between the parties.'" Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, f 12, — P.3d43
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- (quoting Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (Utah 1972)). The
allegations that Matrix attempted to inject into the proceedings through Catinella's
third affidavit, not filed until after Matrix had submitted its reply memo,
constituted an alleged prior oral agreement that would have altered the meaning of
the parties' integrated agreement.14 Through these allegations, Matrix sought to
. evade the effect of the Agreement's condition precedent. The Agreement
specified that it would become an enforceable contract only after Matrix supplied
a Product Price List and only after Innerlight accepted the list in writing.
Addendum B, ^f 2(b). Catinella's conclusions were no more than an effort to vary
the integrated terms of the parties' executory agreement and, thus, inadmissible.
In sum, based upon these multiple alternative grounds, the trial court's
decision to exclude sections of Catinella's Third Affidavit based upon Innerlight's
unopposed motion to strike was proper and well within the trial court's
considerable discretion. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
14

The Agreement included the following language:
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties
with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be
amended or modified except by written instrument signed by
each of the parties hereto.

Addendum B If 12. This language mirrors the language at issue in
Tangren v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ^J 13, — P.3d — ; thus, under
Tangren, Catinella's allegations related to prior oral agreements between
the parties are precluded. The Agreement goes even further, stating that
no "promises or agreements" between the parties not embodied herein or
incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or effect.
Addendum B, If 12; R. 879-80.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the multiple alternative grounds noted above, including Matrix's
failures to challenge dispositive trial court rulings, Innerlight respectfully requests
that this Court (1) affirm the trial court's grant of Innerlight's motion for summary
judgment and the denial of Matrix's motion for summary judgment; and (2) affirm
the trial court's rulings on the parties' motions to strike.

• th

DATED this 4in day of April 2008.

David L. Arrington
Thomas J. Burns
Durham Jones & Pinegar
Attorney for Appellee Innerlight, Inc.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

DURHAM, JONES & PINBGAR

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Post Office Box 4050
Sail Lake City. Utah 84i 10-4050
Telephone: (801) 415-3000

-Deputy

Thomas F.J. MacAniff
PA Attorney J.D. No. 01895
Ursula H. Leo
PA Attorney l.D. No. 91281
EASTBURN AND GRAY. V.C.
60 East Court Street
Doyleslown, PA 18901
Telephone: (215) 345-7000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Innerlight, Inc.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

INNERLIGHT. INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC
Defendant.

ORDER (1) GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE
PORTIONS OF THE THIRD
AFFIDAVIT OF ANTHONY R.
CANTINELLA
AND
(2) DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF
TATE'S AFFIDAVIT

Civil No. 060400775
Judge Fred D. Howard

Defendant The Matrix Group. LLC ("Matrix"), filed its Motion lo Strike Portions of
Tate's Affidavit. Plainliff, Innerlight. Inc. ("Innerlight") moved to strike paragraphs 3, 6-14 and
Exhibits A & B of the Third Affidavit of Anthony R Cantinella. Matrix filed this affidavit after

Innerlight's briefing had closed along with Matrix's reply memorandum in support of Matrix's
motion for summary judgment. These motions came on for on January 17,2007, in conjunction
with the parlies' cross motions for summary judgment. David L. Arrington and Matthew G.
Grimmer appeared for Plaintiff, Innerlighl Inc. Stephen Quesenberry and CharJes L. Perschon
appeared for Defendant, Matrix. The parties agreed to submil both motions.
Having studied the motions, authorities and affidavits, .the Court ORDERS AS
FOLLOWS:
L

Plaintiff Innerlighl lnc.\s Motion to Strike Portions of the Third Affidavit of

Anthony R. Cantinella. which was unopposed, is GRANTED.
2.

Defendant The Matrix Group, LLC's Motion to Strike Portions of Tate's

Affidavit is DENIED.

Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
Attorneys for The Matrix Group, LLC
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APR 1 8 2007
Durham Jones & Pinegar

Fourth Judicial District Court
^ County, State of Utah

o f ut

m^ 0-?

.Deputy

David L. Arlington (4267)
Matthew G. Grimmer (9692)
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAK

] ] ] East Broadway, Suite 900
Posl Office Box 4050
SaJt Lake City, Utah 841 ] 0-4050
Telephone: (801)415-3000
Thomas F.J. MacAniff
PA Attorney I.D. No. 01895
Ursula H. Leo
PA Attorney I.D. No. 9128J
EASTBURN AND GRAY. P.C.
60 East Court Street
Doylestown, PA 18901
Telephone: (215) 345-7000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Innerlight, Inc.

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT' COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

INNERLIGHT, INC.,
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF
INNERLIGHT, INC.'S
MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 060400775

THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC
Defendant.

Judge Fred D. Howard

Plaintiff Innerligb.t. Inc. ("lnnerlight") moved foj summary judgment on its requesl that
the Exclusive Distributor Agreemeni (the "Agreement'5) between the parties be adjudged
ineffective executor)' contmct and for related relief The Matrix Group, LLC ("Matrix") filed a
]

cross motion for summary judgment, seeking to have the Agreement adjudged enforceable and lo
enforce the Agreement's forum-selection clause. David L. ArringLon and Matthew G. Grimmer
appeared for Plaintiff, Innerlight. Stephen Quesenberry and Charles L. Perschon appeared for
Defendant, Matrix.
Having studied the parties' memoranda, the pleadings and affidavits on file and having
heard oral argument from counsel, the Court finds, concludes and ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:
I.

Facts

The following facts are undisputed, or as a matter of law there is no contradictory
evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242,252 (1986) (evidence on summary judgment is viewed "through the prism of
the substantive evidentiary burden;" court must ask "whether a fair-minded jury could return a
verdict for the-plaintiff on the Evidence presented."); Robinson v. lntermountain Health Care.
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
1.

Innerlight is a Delaware corporation, authorized to conduct business in Utah, with its

principle place of business in Provo, Utah.
2.

Matrix is a Florida limited liability company, with its principle place of business in Palm

Beach County, Florida.
3.

In October 2004, Matrix and Innerlight executed the Exclusive Distributor Agreement

under which Matrix could, subject to the terms and provisions of the Agreement, appoint
Innerlight an exclusive distributor and sell Innerlight certain cosmetic products bearing the

9

"Beverly Sassoon" name to InneriighL, and InneriighL, subjeci to the conditions of the
Agreement could accept the distributorship appointment and buy Matrix's cosmetic products.
a.

The Agreement recites that "Distributor [Innerlight] desires to be the exclusive

distributor" of the described products, and that "Company [Matrix] is willing to make
Distributor its exclusive distributor for such purposes.. alJ in accordance with and
pursuant to the terms and conditions more fully set forth . . . ." Agreement at ] (first
recital )(emphasis supplied).
b.

Paragraph 2(a) also states in part that "[s]ubject to the terms and provisions set

forth in this Agreement, Company hereby appoints Distributor as the exclusive
distributor" of defined products. Agreement at 2.
c.

Paragraph 2(b) states:
The acceptance of this appointment by Distributor [Innerlight] is
conditioned upon Distributor's written acceptance of Company's
[Matrix's] Product Price List which shall not be subject to change
until October 17,2006.

Id. (Emphasis supplied).
d.

Paragraph 12 states in part:
This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the parties with
respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended or
modified except by a written instrument signed by each of the
parties hereto . . . . No party shall be construed as having waived
any of its rights hereunder unless such waiver shall be in writing
signed by the parly against whom such waiver is being sought.
Neither the failure of any party to exercise any power given such
party hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by any other
party with its obligations hereunder, nor any custom or practice of
the parties at variance with the terms hereof, shall constitute a

J

waiver of any parly's right to demand exact compliance with the
terms hereof. . . . No representations, inducements, promises or
agreements, oral or otherwise, between the parlies not embodied
herein or incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or
effect.
4.

The parties5 representatives participated in several telephone conversations prior to

October 2004, discussing potential product pricing. Prior to Octobei* 2004, Innerlight's Wesley
Tate forwarded to Matrix's Rick Cantinella a spread sheet containing certain notions of pricing
that Innerlight wanted to evaluate.
5.

Matrix never gave its "Company Product Price List" to Innerlight. Matrix advanced no

admissible evidence that it had ever created a company price list.
6.

Innerlight never made a written acceptance of a Matrix company product price list.

7.

Innerlight and Matrix did not agree on overall contract pricing.

8.

On October 11, 2004, Innerlight made a single order for five cosmetic products by

issuing one purchase order (sometimes referred to here as the "POs") for each type of product.
The POs were sent to Matrix.
9.

Natural Bronze, LLC ("Natural Bronze"), a Florida limited liability company which is

separate from Matrix, sent multiple invoices for the products Innerlight ordered. Matrix sent
Innerlight one invoice for one cosmetic product.
10.

Innerlight paid for its one-time purchase, sending nine payments to Natural Bronze; no

payments were made to Matrix.
] 1.

Innerlight's POs identify a specific, limited quantity of product.
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12.

Innerlight made efforts on line and otherwise to promote and sell the Matrix "Beverly

Sassoon" producl through Innerlight \s distributors.
] 3.

Innerlight received complaints from customers that certain Matrix products caused

"burning'' to the customer's skin, that a lotion was "runny", and that lotion pumps were
inoperable.
14.

Ultimately, Innerlight notified its distributors that Innerlight would discontinue selling

the Beverly Sassoon Product line.
15.

Innerlight brought this action, seeking among other things, a declaration that the

Agreement was an unenforceable executory agreement.
16.

Matrix moved to dismiss this action, arguing that the Agreement was enforceable and that

choice-of-venue terms in paragraph 12 required the action to be heard in Florida. The Court
denied the motion to dismiss under a previous order (see Order Denying Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss Under Rule 12 (b) (3)).
17.

Matrix did not plead the affirmative defense of ratification and did not timely seek to

amend its pleadings to assert the defense.
18.

Innerlight did not prepare and/or execute a writing waiving (oi even referring to) any of

Innerlight\s rights under the Agreement. Innerlight did not intend to waive any rights under the
Agreement. And the parties did nol enter into a written, signed amendment or modification to
the Agreement.
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]9.

Matrix did no! reasonably rely to iLs detriment on any conduct of lnnerlight. Matrix's

affidavits do no! allege thai Matrix relied on lnnerlighfs conduct or the conduct of lnnerlighfs
parent company.
20.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude Matrix's motion for summary judgment.

21.

No genuine issue of material fact precludes summary judgment for lnnerlight.
II.

Conclusions of Law:

Based upon the above, and lnnerlighfs other points, authorities and arguments, the Court
concludes as follows:
1.

Paragraph 2(b) of the Agreement creates an express condition precedent.

2.

This express condition precedent is not to be ignored, weighed or helped with evidence

regarding a course of performance or course of dealing.
3.

Paragraph 12 of the Agreement precludes any amendment or modification except by a

written instrument signed by the parties. And the parties did not enter into a written, signed
amendment or modification to the Agreement.
4.

Under the Agreement, both Matrix's appointment of lnnerlight as a distributor and

lnnerlighfs acceptance of appointment, were subject to the Agreement's terms and conditions.
Agreement paragraphs 2(a) & (b). The Agreement did no1 become an enforceable contract
because the material condition precedent of paragraph 2(b) (lnnerlight*s written cicceptance of
Matrix's company product price list) was not satisfied. Without the prerequisite acceptance, the
Agreement was an unenforceable executory contract, and lnnerlighfs duties and obligations
under the overall Agreement remained unenforceable. See e^g.. The Cantamar. L.L.C. v.
6

Champamie. 2006 UT App 321, PI 6 (Aug. 3, 2006) ("failure of a material condition precedent
relieves the obligor of any duty to perform"), quoting Harper v. Greal Sail Lake Council. Inc..
1999 UT34.P14, 976 P.2d 1213. See also Brownsville Advanced Medical imagine. L.P.. v.
Capitalwerks. LLC, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6360, (Tex. App. -Corpus Clirisli [13lh Disl.]
2005)(unpublished opinion) (based on unmet conditions, the court denied a motion to dismiss
grounded on a forum-selection clause, concluding: "Brownsville Imaging was not bound by the
terms of an executory contract, much less by a forum selection clause within the same executory
instrument.")- As a result, the forum-selection and law-selection provisions, which appear in the
Agreement, are unenforceable. These terms are ineffective because the Agreement itself has not
first been established.
5.

The venue terms and the minimum purchase obligations under the Agreement are not

enforceable because the Agreement is an ineffective executory contract.
6.

MATRIX DID NOT FULFILL THE CONDITION PRECEDENT
Matrix argued that, even though it supplied no company price list which Imierlight

accepted in writing, the POs from Innerlight's one-time order should be considered "tantamount
to written acceptance of Defendant *s [Matrix's] prices as required by the Agreement."1 This is
incorrect as a matter of law for the following reasons:

1

Matrix also implies thai it fulfilled the paragraph 2(b) requirement that Matrix's pricing
nol be subject to change." saying Matrix "never changed'' the price. This is incorrect. Matrix
did not set an initial price, and there was never a second order and no opportunity for change if it
had. No Matrix company price list was produced before or after Irmerlighf s order, much less
one expressing the not-subjecl-to-change commitment required by paragraph 2(b).
c%
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a.

Matrix's "fulfillment" theory is contrary to the terms of paragraph 2(b). The POs

could only "fulfil J" paragraph 2(b), under Matrix's theory, if the term required Innerlight (instead
of Matrix) to supply the price list and Matrix to make written acceptance as the condition.
However, the Agreement requires Matrix to supply pricing which Innerlight has the right to
accept if it approves. And Matrix never supplied company pricing for Innerlight to accept oil-eject by PO or otherwise.
b.

The POs are insufficient as a matter of law to constitute an "acceptance" for

overall contract pricing. First, Matrix supplied no company price list for the POs to accept.
Second, even if there were a fixed Matrix company price list capable of acceptance, the POs on
their face do not purport to accept anything beyond a one-time order for a specified, limited
quantity of product. They do not state that they "accept" or approve pricing for years of
purchases of unknown quantities of product, contrary to what Matrix implies. They contain no
reference to an)' price list, to paragraph 2(b), or any other Agreement term. Indeed, the section
of the POs entitled "Terms," states that there are "none." The POs as a matter of law do not
create pricing for an overall contract.
c.

Paragraph 12 of the Agreement and Utah's Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")

preclude Matrix's claim that the Agreement should be construed as "fulfilled" with reference to
evidence of the parties' actions, and they preclude Matrix's claim that the POs "accept" a precontract oral agreement on overall contract pricing.
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i.

Paragraph 12 and UCC 3 2-202.

Paragraph 12 confirms that "this Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the
parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended or modified except by a
written instrument signed by each of the parties hereto." It goes on to state that u |n]o
representations, inducements, promises or agreements, oral or otherwise, between the parties not
embodied herein or incorporated herein by reference shall be of any force or effect." These
terms bar consideration of evidence of Matrix's alleged extra-contract, oral understanding on
overall contract pricing, which Matrix improperly raised for the first time by affidavit submitted
with Matrix's reply memorandum after Innerlighf's briefing had closed."
These integration terms of paragraph 12 are unambiguous and they confirm the parties'
intent that the Agreement was the final expression of their agreement with respect to its terms.
Accordingly, as a matter of law, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-202"1 independently precludes
evidence of any alleged oral pricing agreement to contradict or limit Innerlighfs rights under
paragraph 2(b) to receive and accept in writing Matrix's company product price.
Paragraph 12 also mandates that neither Innerlighl nor Matrix could look to evidence of
their course of performance to interpret the Agreement. It states in part that no "custom or
practice of the parties at variance with the terms hereof, shall constitute a waiver of any party's
rights to demand exact compliance with the terms hereof." Under this term, regardless of
* This evidence was also subject to InnerlighlJs motion to strike which Matrix did not
oppose and which the court granted by separate order.
•* Specific sections of Utah Code Ann. Section 70A (Utah's Uniform Commercial Code)
are referred to in this order as "UCC §
."
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]nnerlighl\s one-time use of POs, innerhght reLamed the righl to insist on cxacl compliance with
the written-acecptance condition of paragraph 2(b)
ii.

UCC (? 2-208 "Course of Performance"

Even absent paragraph 12, the evidence of custom and practice that Matrix raises cannot
be considered to construe the Agreement. Under UCC § 2-208(1), a course of performance is
relevant in determining the meaning of an agreement, kl. But foi conduct to qualify as a "course
of performance" that may be considered, it must involve "repeated occasions for performance by
either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity foi objection by
it." Id. "A single occasion of conduct does not fall within the language of this section." UCC §
2-208. cmt. 4. See also 2 ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE sec. 2-208:5, at 300 (] 982)
("[IJt necessarily follows that there is no course of performance when there are merely
intermittent casual or isolated . .. performances. A single incident. . . does not constitute a
course of dealings or performance."). Because Inneiiight made just one order of each of the five
Sassoon products, using one PO per product, as a matter of law the POs are not a "course of
performance'* that may be considered to construe the Agreement's pricing terms under paragraph
2(b)
d.

UCC 3 2-201 (1)

Alternatively, the statute of frauds applied by the UCC to sales of goods bars use of.
Innerlight's POs from a one-time, limited-quantity order to "satisfy" the price-lisi/wrillenacceptance condition of paragraph 2(b) and establish a multimillion clollai overall "contract.'"
Under UCC §2-201(1):
10

a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contracl for salt has been made
between the parties and signed . . . . [B]ut the contract is not
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing.
Under this section, even if POs were a "writing sufficient" to establish a contract (and
they are not under the Agreement's terms and UCC 2-305(4)), Matrix is precluded from
enforcing by "action or defense" an overall "contract" because the POs only order a limited
quantity of goods. UCC 2-201 (1) bars enforcement of the POs beyond the quantity of goods
they ordered, and hinerlight already paid for those. Innerlight preserved this affirmative defense
through timely amendment.
For each of the above alternative reasons, as a matter of law. Matrix cannot establish an
overall contract with pricing from the Innerlight POs. The condition of paragraph 2(b) was not
"fulfilled."
7.

WAIVER: Innerlight did not waive its rights under paragraphs 2(b) and 12.
a. Innerlight made no written waiver.
Under paragraph 12 of the Agreement, Innerlight could not waive rights under the

Agreement without an express written waiver by Innerlight allowing Matrix to bypass the
condition precedent. Innerlight supplied no written waiver of any rights. Innerlight did not
waive rights under paraigraph 2(b). the anti-waiver terms of paragraph 12, or any other terms of
the Agreement.
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b Innerliuhfs conduct did not waive the condition precedent
Paragraph J2 and UCC § 2-208 independently bai Matrix's attempt to claim any
Inneriight waiver by referring to the parties" actions, just as they barred the same evidence under
Matrix's "fuifiJlmenl" theory.
c. There is no evidence of intent as a matter of law.
Alternatively, Matrix can not meet the high standard of proof for its claim as a matter of
law. In Utah, "[a] waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute
waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a laiowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it." Soter's. Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 857 P.2d 935,
942 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). The aciaiowledgement of intent ensures "that waiver would
not be found from any particular set of facts unless clearly intended." Id. at 940 (emphasis
supplied).
Matrix did not identify where Inneriight '''clearly" manifests its intent to waive its right
under paragraph 2(b) to accept an agreed Matrix company price list in writing (or its intent to
waive terms of paragraph 12) before agreeing to be bound to an overall contract. Matrix
combines the following as evidence of Inneriight ?s waiver: (1) evidence of Inneriight "s one-time
order; (2) evidence of Beverly Sassoon's appearances; (3) statements issued by Quigley

l]

Matrix could well have refused to produce Ms. Sassoon (whose initial appearance
Matrix arranged even before the Agreement was executed), and could have refused to sell and
ship product until Matrix had supplied its company price list to inneriight and had received
Innerlighf s written acceptance under paragraph 2(b).
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Corporation (an lnnerlighl parent company); and (4) information posted on Innerlight's web site.
Even if this evidence were not barred under paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208, as a matter of law
Matrix's evidence does not show "clearly/5 distinctly, and without blending, that' lnnerlighl
intended to relinquish its entitlement to insist on precise performance under paragraphs 2(b) and
12. Matrix's evidence does not refer to or deal with paragraph 2(b) or paragraph 12. Viewing
Matrix's evidence in light most favorable to Matrix, as a matter of law it cannot meet the
evidentiary burden to establish Innerlight's intentional relinquishment of a known right under
paragraphs 2(b) and 12 of the Agreement.
d. Even if waiver could be shown, lnnerlighl revoked it.
Alternatively, even if Matrix could have shown a waiver "distinctly" and "clearly," any
such waiver was effectively revoked within the meaning of UCC § 2-209(5) through express,
written notice to Matrix on Decembei-12, 2005. This was reasonable notification to Matrix that
strict performance with paragraph 2(b) was required. And, because Matrix's affidavits make no
claim that Matrix relied on Innerlight's conduct to its detriment, the retraction would not be
unjust as a matter of law.
e. UCC $ 2-201 (1) (UCC Statute of Frauds') Bars Matrix's Waiver Theory
Alternatively, even if Matrix could otherwise establish that lnnerlighl "clearly intended" to
waive the price-lisl/wrilten-acceplanee condition of paragraph 2(b), Matrix was still required to
establish agreed-to pricing before it could establish an overall contract. As explained above,
Matrix's effort to establish overall contract prices based on one-time order prices culled from
Innerlight's POs is barred by the UCC's statute of frauds (UCC § 2-201(1)). And the POs could
13

nol be enforced beyond the quantity 0/ goods they identify. Beyond this, evidence 0/ any alleged
oral price agreement is precluded by paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-202. as explained above.
In sum. for alternative reasons. Matrix's waiver theory is precluded and 'cannot establish
an overall enforceable contract 01 preclude summary judgment for Jnnerlight as a matter of law.
8.

RATIFICATION: Matrix's ratification theory is waived and is inapplicable as a matter

of law.
a. Matrix's ratification theory is waived.
Matrix did not affirmatively plead the defense of ratification and it is barred under rule
"8(c). Utah R. Civ. P.. [which] requires a party to set forth 'any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.5 otherwise, the defense is waived." Pratt v. Board of Educ,
564 P.2d 294. 297 (Utah 1977) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h)). While Utah courts have not
addressed whether "ratification'*' is an affirmative defense that must be pled or waived, other
courts have. See e ^ , Robinson v. Powell 348 N.C. 562, 566 (N.C. 1998) (citing N.C.
equivalent to Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c)) ("Ratification is an affirmative defense which must^e
affirmatively pled."): FD1C v. Calhoun. 34 F.3d 1291. 1299 (5 ,h Cir. 1994) ("Likewise, while
ratification is not one of the enumerated affirmative defenses under FED.R.CIV.P. 8(c), Texas
law treats ratification as a defense.";: Silsbec Hosp.. Inc. v. George, ] 63 S.W.3d 284, 292 (Tex.
App. 2005) (holding unpled ratification argument waived). Because Matrix did not plead the
affirmative defense of ratification; it is waived.
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b. Innerliuhl's conduct cannot be evidence of ratification.
Paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 independently bar Matrix's attempt to support its
ratification theory by referring to the parlies' actions, just as they barred such evidence under
Matrix's fulfillment and waiver theories, as explained above,
c. Ratification is inapplicable.
Matrix's ratification theory cannot cause the Agreement to become an enforceable overall
contract as a matter of law. Matrix rehearses the same course-of-performance evidence cited as
support for its other theories and then just concludes that Innerlight, "by its conduct, ratified the
Contract." But the "contract" Matrix says was ratified is the Agreement, and it still contains the
unfulfilled condition precedent of paragraph 2(b), and it still raises the bar of paragraph 12 to the
very "evidence" of the parties' custom or practice on which Matrix's theories depend. There is
no other agreement. As a matter of law, Matrix cannot selectively eliminate terms from the
Agreement simply by saying the Agreement was "ratified."
d. Ratification is barred by UCC S$ 2-201(1) and 2-202.
Alternatively, the UCC's statute of frauds (UCC § 2-201(1)) precludes efforts to employ
the POs to establish pricing to enforce an overall contract under this theory as it does with
Matrix's "waiver" or "fulfillment" theories. And the POs could not be enforced themselves
beyond the quantity of goods they identify. Additionally, evidence of any alleged oral price
agreement is precluded by paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-202, as explained above
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In sum, for alternative reasons, ratification theory is waived or is inapplicable and eannol
establish an overall enforceable contract or preclude summary judgment for lnnerlighl as a
mattej- of law.
9.

ESTOPPEL: Matrix's estoppel theory is inapplicable as a matter of law.
a.

The evidence on which Matrix bases its theory is precluded under paragraph 12

and UCC § 2-208.
b.

Matrix failed to meet all elements required for estoppel. Even if Matrix's

underlying evidence of conduct were not precluded, Matrix failed adequately to allege or adduce
evidence sufficient to establish on summary judgment that it reasonably relied on the kmerlighf s
conduct. First Matrix adduced no evidence that it relied on Innerlight's conduct; Matrix's
affidavits contain no allegation that Matrix relied on Innerlight's actions. Accordingly, Matrix
failed to establish the required ^reliance" element of an estoppel claim.
Second, even if Matrix's affidavits had alleged reliance, Matrix's reliance would be
unreasonable as a matter of law based on the record before the Court, particularly where the
Agreement defined where reliance could/could not be possible. "[Wjhen the alleged promises
aire contrary to the terms of the contract, reliance on such promises would be unreasonable."
Wardley Corp. v. Meredith Corp., No. 03-4021, 93 Fed. Appx. 183r 186 (10th Cir. Feb. 24,
2004) (unpublished opinion) (applying Utah law) (holding no reasonable reliance on oral
promises not to sell trademark when contract did nol disallow such a sale); see also Woods v.
NalM Med. Care. Inc., No. 01-2056., 25 Fed. Appx. 767. 772 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished
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opinion) (holding reliance on oral promises not reasonable when parly knew of written
agreement that contradicted the oral pi onuses)
Matrix knew undei the Agreement that it was required to supply a company price list m a
form that could not change foi a defined period as a condition precedent to lnnerhght's
appointment and acceptance as a distributor. But Matrix supplied no price list. Matrix knew
undei the Agreement that receipt of lnnerhght's written acceptance of Matrix's fixed price list
was required to meet the condition precedent. But Matrix did not receive a written acceptance
and did nothing about it Id. Matrix knew undei paragraph 12 of the Agreement that it could not
rely on any oral agreement or representation (and it was disputed that such an oral "agreement'5
occurred), or upon any evidence of the parties' custom and practice to negate Innerlight's
express right to insist on exact compliance. Matrix could not reasonably rely on any Innerlight
actions here because this collides directly with the express terms of the Agreement.
This result is also confirmed by Matrix's knowledge of facts outside of the Agreement.
Matrix knew by at least April 2005 of Innerlight's intent not to perform under an overall
"contract" when Innerlight made none of the payments required in the second quarter or any
subsequent quarlei under the Agreement. And Matrix was expressly reminded in December
2005 that Innerlight had not given written acceptance of a Matrix price list, and had not accepted
the distributorship appointment. Accordingly, it would be unreasonable as a matter of law for
Matrix to rely on lnnerlighf s alleged conduct.
c.

Matrix's Estopple theory (like its other theories) is barred by the statute of frauds

in UCC § 2-201 because there is no price oi quantity term for an enforceable overall contract.
17

Additionally, evidence of any alleged oral price agreemenl is precluded by paragraph 12 and
UCC' § 2-202, as explained above.
For alternative reasons, Matrix's estoppel theory cannot establish an overall enforceable
contract, or preclude summary judgment for Innerlight. as a matter of law.
] 0.

Public statements made by Innerlight*'s parent company do not constitute or contradict

Innerlight's intention, or preclude lnnerlighf's right to enforce the condition precedent in the
Agreement.
] ].

Innerlight did not excuse Matrix from strict compliance with the condition precedent in

the Agreement.
12.

PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTION;

Matrix's practical-construction theory is barred or is .

otherwise inapplicable as a matter of law.
a.

Matrix improperly raised this theory for the first time in its reply brief after

Innerlight's briefing was closed, and the Court need not consider it.
b.

Matrix cites the same evidence for this claim that it cites to support its other

theories. Howevei-. paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-208 preclude consideration of such evidence.
Thus., as a matter of law. there is insufficient evidence to sustain this theory.
c.

UCC § 2-208 (entitled "Course of performance or practical construction1')

displaces Matrix's common law practical-construction theory in this UCC sales-of-goods case.
See UCC § 1-103 (noting thai principles of equity may supplement provisions of the UCC
"|u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this act. . . ."J. Moreover, Matrix employs
common-law practical-construction principies (and the principles of ail its equitable theories) to
18

supplant the UCC's provisions, not merely to "supplement'* them. And under UCC § 1-103.
tk

whilc principles of common law and equity may supplement provisions 0/ the Uniform

Commercial Code they may not be used to supplant its provisions." UCC § 1 -1"03, cmt. 2.
Even if pled as required under UCC § 2-208; Matrix's practical-construction claim would
fail because the parties did not have occasion for repeat performance. And even if occasion for
such performance had existed. Matrix's characterization of its evidence of performance and the
Agreement's express terms cannot be construed as consistent The Court thus concludes that the
Agreement's express terms, including paragraphs 2(b) and 12, control under UCC § 2-208 (2).
d.

Even if Matrix's common law practical-construction theory were not otherwise

precluded, the Court concludes that it would fail even under the elements of the authorities
Matrix cites because paragraphs 2(bj and 12 are unambiguous.
e.

Like Matrix's other theories, the practical-construction theory still depends on,

among other things, agreed pricing before an overall enforceable contract could exist. But
Matrix's evidence of price is barred by the statute of frauds in UCC § 2-201 because there is no
price or quantity term for an enforceable overall contract. And evidence of any alleged oral price
agreement is precluded by paragraph 12 and UCC § 2-202: as explained above.
For alternative reasons, Matrix's practical!-construction theory cannot establish an overall
enforceable contract or preclude summary judgment foi lnnerlight as a matter of law.
13.

UCC $2-305(4) Beyond principles governing the condition precedent, lnnerlight and

Matrix are not bound by "contract'" undei UCC § 2-305 (4) which slates:
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Where, howevei, the parlies intend nol to he bound unless Lhc price be Ilxed or
agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is no contract In such a ease the buyer
must return any goods already received or if unable so to do must pay then
reasonable value at the Lime of delivery and the sellei must return any portion of the
price paid on account.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-305(4) (emphasis supplied).
Tht parties' intent is plain from the Agreement itself. The condition precedent of
paragraph 2(b) expresses the parlies' intent that Innerlight would not be bound as a distributor
absent its written acceptance of fixed Matrix company pricing terms. Paragraph 2(a) expresses
the parlies' intent that Matrix would not be bound to an appointment of Innerlight as a distributor
absent satisfaction of the Agreement's other terms which include the condition precedent of
paragraph 2(b). Because the condition remains unsatisfied, no overall contract exists under the
UCC. See e^g., Quaker State Mushroom Co.. lnc v. Dominick's Friar Foods. Inc., 635 F. Supp.
1281. 1286 (N.D.IU. 1986); Unued Foods. Inc. v Hadley-Peoples Manu. Co.. ] 994 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 277 (Tenn. App Ct. May 20., 1994) (unpublished opinion).
14.

Under UCA § 2-305(4), Innerlight is required to return to Matrix the products Innerlight

purchased under the POs which remain within Innerlight's custody and control Matrix is
required lo refund to Innerlight the purchase price paid to Matrix for items returned.
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THEREFORE, based on the above, and Inneriight \s other arguments and authorities, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.

Plaintiff Innerlighl Inc.'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED,

2.

Defendant The Matrix Group LLC's motion for summary judgment is DENIED,

3.

Inneriight shall within 30 days of entry of this Order ship to Matrix all Matrix Sassoon

products in Inneriight \s possession Shipment shall be made to Matrix's address identified on
the Inneriight POs. Matrix shall accept delivery at that location. However, if Matrix notifies
Inneriight in writing within 5 business days after entry of this order of a different delivery
address within the United States, Inneriight shall ship to, and Matrix shall accept delivery at, that
address. Matrix shall, within 15 days of shipment by Inneriight, return to Inneriight that portion
of the price Inneriight paid associated with the type and number of goods returned.
Dated

d/WA.

/&>

, 2007.
BY THE COURT

z&

Hon trecl D. Howard
APPROVED AS TO FORM

Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
Attorneys for The MaLrix Group, LLC
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THIS EXCLUSIVE ttlSTRIBUTOR AGREEMENT i3 made and entered into as of the
day of
^ 2004, between THE MATRIX GROW> LLC ("Company"),
and INNERUGHT, INC rDiatribuioO.
WITNESSETH
W H H R E ^ f e m s f ^ is licerosd U> sell product* under the brand name "BEVERLY
SASSOON11 thro^sptiJ^^vorld; and
WHEItEAS, Distributor dssircs to be the exclusive distributor of certain of Company's
BKVfiRLV SASSOON brand name products m the multilevel maAetu*&/m$wort: marketing
industry within the territory more p&rtbuWly described below, and Company is willing to make
Distributor ik exclusive distributor for such purposes, art! in sccordaiioe with and pursuant to the
terms and amdirions more fully set forth below;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the above, the mutual covenants and agreement?
$fct forth herein, and other good *ind valuable consideration, the receipt mid arufficittrvcy of which ar&
hereby acknowledged, tlic parties hereto do hereby Agree as follows;
L

Cpmaaiff f t o ^ t t l ^ p m ff^d Wam^ics.

The Company hereby represents and Vfitfnmta to Distributor as follows:
(4)

That the Company:

(i)
has a HCCPSS to utilize Ihe BEVERLY SASSOON name on, among
other things, the Company's cosmetics, eosma^uti^s, ftwrrsseuticab, tanning*
make-up, vitannns, baby-product? and pet products; and
(ii)
such license is for & stated term at least as long as the term of this
Agreement; and
(iii)
the aforesaid license ts in full force and effect and Company is not in
default thereunder; and
(iv)
Company will fceep said license in effect for the full t$rm of tins
Agirccrnem; and
(b)
That in cooo««ioo with the License
SASSOON name with Beverly Saasooo lntcnuitioiuil, LLC
warranted thrit it has tte rights to the BEVERLY SASSOON
Company from all losses, claims, damages, wards, penalties

Agreement for tine BEVERLY
("Licensor"), the Licenw bus
name and tfat it will indemnify
and injuries which may arise m

ft*

m
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connection with any claim by any third party of any alleged infringement of copyright, trademark or
otter intellectual property n&hts pertaining lo the use of the BEVERLY SASSOQN name; and
(c)
That in the event any party makes any claim for the infMnseaenent of
etxpyright, trademark or other intellectual property rights concerning the use of the OEVE&LY
S ASSOQN bnwd ruune in connection with any of the Products <a& defined below), Company wtti,
promptly following its receipt of notice of sucti claim from Distributor, call upon Licensor to
provide, the indemnifications requited oadcr the License Agrecmem between the Company and tte
Liceaaor and that Company will hold Distributor harmless from all losses* claims, dwi&gefl, awaitis,
penttlika or injuries nrising out of such infringement claims.

2.

AB^mtmeitufi>i5triM(>r.

(a)
Subject to the terms and provisions set forth in this Agreement, Company
hereby appoints Distributor as the exclusive distributor for the Products (defined below) within the
Territory (defined below) insofar »$, but only insofar as, the Industry (defined below) is concerned,
As m&A herein, the term "Products" shall mean the Company's cosmetics, co&mat&uik&hSt
nutmeutic&te. tanning, m/dce*up, vtumins, baby-product* and pet products frum time to time
bearing the BEVERLY SASSOQN name. As used herein, tine term 'Territory" shall include all
worldwide uuufats, including the United States, exeept for Asia (Am is expressly excluded from
the Territory)- A$ used herein, the term "Industry7* shall mean the multi-level ?*Mce!inj>; and
network marketing industries Company expressly agrees that it will not sell Products bearing the
BEVERLY SASSOON name within the Territory to any other jp^xty operating wjthb the Industry
and that Company wffl not itself engage in the Industry- to sell Phraducts bearing the BEVERLY
SASSOQN nmn& on a multilevel marketing/network mwkcting basis* It is e/cpitrssly understood
m& agreed* however, not by way of limitation, that the Company may sell BEVERLY SASSOON
branded products or services other than the Product* to «oy other parties of its choosing, and ihstt
Company may sell Products bearing the BEVERLY SASSOQN name to any Other parties of its
choosing who are not involved in the Industry, in any market (worldwide, regional* tecal orother]U
whether on aretail,wholesale or my ofiwr basis, and that Company may sell pjo4t*ct$ bearing the
BEVERLY SASSOQN name to companies engaged in the Industry within the continent of Asisu all
without being in violation of this Agreement
(b)
The acceptance of this appointment by Distributor fa conditioned tipon
Distributor's written acceptance of Company's Product Price List which shall not be subject to
chao^euj^U October 17,2006.

3.

Ism-

Subject to the termination rights elsewhere set forth in this Agreement, the tertn of this
Agreement shall commence as of the date first set forth above and shall end on October 17, 201X
AH obligations of the Company and ajl rights of Distributor shall cease and terminate at the end of
the aforesaid term and the Company shall thereafter be under no restrictions insofar as the safe of
Productsfaconcerned*
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The Company advises Distributor that Company has the,rightto require the person Beverly
SaSHOOn to make at least four (4) persona! appearances per year and thai the Company will permit
Distributor to utilize up to four (4) such personal appearances provided th**t Distributor pays
Beverly Saasou the required sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500-00) per
uppcttrwice plus the Distributor sh#|l be obttgrtcd to pay the expenses of Bavcriy Simoon
associated with the making of such appearances, H is understood that *uch appearance* are subject
to mutually Agreeable scheduling times,
5.

Minimum Sales Requirement and Termination Rights ftf Company If Mmimutp

Sfllff? RcflUir^cnts Arc Not Met

Distributor acknowledges* vndcwwids and agrees that Distributor is receiving e*dusive
rights to sell Products within the Industry and within the Territory solely because Distributor has
agreed, end hereby agrees* to purchase Products in at least the minimumOTJotmfcistss. forth Wow *t
all titles during the term of this /Agreement, Distributor agrees to comply with each "Minimum
Purchase Rcquircmcntn established below and Distributor acknowledges that Company may
terminate this Agreement and all of Distributor'srightshereunder and all of Company's obligations
hereunder in the event Distributor fails to satisfy my Minimum Purchase Requirement At w y time,
which termination shall be effective upon Company's giving, Distributor ten (JO) d$*ys written notice
of such termination. The Minimum Purchase Requirements relating to the Products art as follow*;
(n)
Company may terminate this agreement if Distributor does not purchase itt
least Seven Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($750,000,00) of Products during the twelve-roonlh
period camrnsnetog October 1& 2004 and ending October 17,2005; and
(b)
Company moy terminate this agreement if Distributor does not purchase at
least One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars (SK50G,000.00) of Products withm the twelve
(12) month period commencing October 18,2005 m6 ending October 17,2006; and
(c)
During each twelve (12) month period thereafter through and including
October 17, 2013, Distributor must purchase at least Pour Million Dollars (^MHUJOG.OG) of
Products from Distributor during each such twelve (i£) month period (i.c, Distributor rnust
purchase at least Four Million Dollars (R0004000.00) of Products from DFstributor during the
period from October t$, 2006 through October 17, 2007, «nd such Four Million Dollars
($4*000,000.00) pvc year purchase of PtoductsrequtrementsfromDistributor shall continue <br e*ch
twelve (12) month period thereafter)In order to satisfy the Minimum Purchase Requirements imposed on Distributor pursuant to
this Agreement, the Distributor must:
(t)
purchase the specified amount of Products within the specific year in
question and cause Company to r£C*ivc f\*H payment for such Products within <each zwh
respective year; and
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(ii)
notwithstanding the forc#oin& Distributor must purchase an amount of
Products from Company each quarter year period (i.cM each October \& through each
January J7, and each January J 8 through each April 17, ai*d each April IS through July 17,
and each July 18 through October 17 during each of nuch years) equal to one-quaner of the
Minimum Purchase Requirement Amount applicable to the year in question, with payment
to be received by Company prior to the end of each such applicable quarter.

6.

Limitations and Prohibitions on Distributor

1! is understood arid agreed that;
(a)
Distributor shall not have or acquire any rights ID my patent*, trademarks,
servicemarks, trade secret* or any other intellectual property rights relating in any manacr to any of
the Products or in or to the mnt of BEVERLY SASSOON.
(b)
Distributor ahall have no rights to use the name BEVERLY SASSOOW ou
any product other than the Products It h expressly undiemood and agreed that Efistributor has 00
right? to use the name BEVERLY SA5SOON on "Human Hair Cam" rotated products as such
would violate the terms of Company's license with Lic&i&or.
tc)
Distributor shall make no claims of health benefits, other benefits, or results
customers could anticipate receiving from BEVERLY SASSOON Products unless such claims arc
eapreasty authorized in wiling by Company or are contained on labels or otiwjr salts nwaicriajs
provided by Company. Distributor shall not make any claims concerning the Products, or
concerning the BEVERLY SASSOON name, or concerning Beverly Sassoon the person without
firs* reviving the prior written authorization U> 4o so from Cwnpsxiy which approval may bzgWm
or withheld within the ?ote discretion of Company.
(d)
Distributor shall not repackage my Product, remove any label or other
idcntHyisg ranking from aoy Product, or otherwise alter my p&khgwg or tebtf of my Product at
any lime. Distributor shall not tamper with, alter, modify, change or otherwise affect any Product
sold to it by Company.
(e)
Distributor shall not #etlr produce, manufacture or otherwise? be involved in <wr
with reaped to any #orxi$ or products simitar to or in competition in any way with any of ths
ProduelH during the term of this Agreement.
(f)

Distributor shall comply with all l a w . statutes, rules and regulation* of any

md all §av&mmcnlAl authorities having juri$diotion over its business opeqaticms,

(g)
Distributor shall market and *c1I the Products, and authorise her distributors
to market and set) the Products, only within the Industry and only within the Territory. Neither
Distributor nor any party acquiring the Products through Distributor shall sell the Products other
than through the multi-lrvel marketing/network marketing channel*.
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Disclaimers.

Except as expressly sot forth heroin, Company makes no representations or warranties ID
Distributor, either express or implied. SPECIFICALLY, BUT NOT BY WAY OP LIMITATION,
COMPANY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND/OR FULNESS
FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE W RESPECT OF THE PRODUCTS.
8<

Default.

(n)
The incurrence of any of the following events shall constitute on Even* of
Dcfauk by Distributor under this Agrcemam:
(1)
Distributor shall foil to satisfy any Minimum Purchase Requirement it
is obligated to comply with pursuam to the provisions of this Agreement or
Distributor shall otherwise fail to pay to Company my amount which Distributor is
obligated to pay to Company;
(ii)
Distributor shall breach or fail to perform any othex duty, obligation
or Agreement on Distributor's part to be complied with or performed pursuant to fltis
Agreement ami Distributor simll have failed to satisfy or cure such default within icn
(10) days after the giving of written notice of such default to Distributor by
Company; t>r
(tii) Distributor shall be or become the subject of any bmikruptcy or
insolvency proceedings.
(b)
Upon the occurrence of any Event of Default, Company may exercise any
one or more of tht following rights andremedies,all of which shall be mutual and cumulative and
not exclusive:
(i)
Terminate this Agreement by giving written notice of such
termination to Distributor; and/or
(ii)
Have andrecoverfTOm Distributor sli damages suflfe^ed by Company
by reason of the occurrence of such Event of Default together with all reasonable attorneys
fee* md disbursements expended oc inarmed by Company in enforcing or pursuing its rights
under this Agistment; and/or
(Hi)

Pursue any oifrer rights or remedies available to the Company at law

or in tHjuity,

Nothing contained fa thte Agreement shall be construed aa constituting a joint
venture, partnership, employer/employee relationship, franchise or other association between the
parties he**fo Distributor is acting onty in the c»p**eity of ait Independent contractor *mf shall have
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no authority, express or implied, to bind, obligate or make any commitme»i or representation fo< or
on behalf of Company,
Any notice required or permitted to be «iven by -any party to the other under this Agreement shaiJ be
in 'writing and shall be delivered by nationally recognized overnight dclivciy service, or by certified
mail withreturnreceipt requested service, delivered to the address for the other party set forth
below, or such changed address ai» stall have been provided by the other party by a notice duly
given hereundex.
If to Company:

The Matrix Group, LLC
1177 George Bush Boulevard
Suite No. 201
Defray Beach, Florida 33483

If to Distributor:

thtarUEht, Inc.
U7 H»»t 2260 South
Prow, Utah 84606
tfffit-

Neither this Agreement nor any lights, duties or obligations hereunder may be assigned by
Distributor without the prior written consent of Company, which may be given or withheld in its
soie discretion,
4 1 frjiscellflflgflus.
This Agreement shall be binding upon, snd inure to the benefit of, the parties hereto and
their respective successors and assigns (provided however, thai nothing contained herein stall be
construed m authorizing any party to assign any rights or instruments which it has agreed not to
assign pursuant to provisions hereinabove contained). This Agreement constitute* tlu* entire
agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and may not be amended at
modified except by « written instrument signed by each of tl*c parties hereto. In the event any party
wnsnences arty action or proceeding to enforce its rights hereunder, the* prevailing party or panics
in any such action shall be entitled to recover all of their costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorneys fee$, inclined in connection therewith from the nw-prevaiiing party or parties, both m
cotuutcttan with tlte original action miating thereto mid any mid fill appeals therefrom. No party
shall be construed us having; waived any of its rights hereunder unless such waiver shall be m
writing signed by the party against whom such waiver is being sought. Neither the failure of any
party to exercise any power given such party hereunder or to insist upon strict compliance by any
other party with its obligations hereunder, nor «ny custom or practice of the parties at variance with
the terms hereof, shall constitute & waiver of any party's right to demand exact compliance with the
terms hereof Tiiis Agreement shall be construed and interpreted under the laws of the Stale of
Florida and the parties agree that any action or proceeding brought concerning this Agreement may
be brought only in the couns of Palm Beach County, Florida, and each party hereto hereby consents
to the jurisdiction of such courts. The parties agree that this Agreement is the result of negotiation
by the putties, each of whom was represented by counsel, and thus, this Agreement shall not be
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construed against the drafter thereof. No representations, inducement, prunuKes or agreements,
oral or otherwise, between the parties not embodied herein or incorporated herein by reference shall
he of any force or effect This Agreement nwy be executed in arty number of courrteypwr**, each of
which shall be deemed to be un originaL but all of which, when taken together, shall constitute but
one and the same instrument. AD references herein ro the aiugular shall include plural, »nd id!
references herein to the masculine gender shall include the feminine and neuter genders, and vice
versa.
IK WITNESS WHEREOF, the- parties hereto have executed this instrument as of tkz date
first aet forth above,
THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC

»y-

/rszf^£2^
lis

tA-Jfy

INNERL1GHT, INC..

Bv /Ofa)L>. «if. ff\ <° 6~*lXy
Its

7

(~fl£& .ffcrnj"

David L. Arlington (4267)
Matthew G. Grimmer (9692)
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR

111 East Broadway, Suite 900
Post Office Box 4050
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-4050
Telephone: (801) 415-3000
Thomas F.J. MacAnifT
PA Attorney I.D. No. 01895
Ursula H. Leo
PA Attorney I.D. No. 91281
EASTBURN AND GRAY. P.C.
60 East Court Street
Doylestown, PA 18901
Telephone: (215) 345-7000
Attorneys for Plaintiff Innerlight, Inc.
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
INNERLIGHT, INC.,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF WESLEY TATE
(Supporting Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment)

vs.
THE MATRIX GROUP, LLC
Defendant.

Civil No. 060400775
Judge Fred D. Howard

STATE OF UTAH )
: ss.
UTAH COUNTY )
WESLEY TATE, having been duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am over 21 years of age and have personal knowledge of, and am

competent to testify to, the following.

2.

I began work for Innerlight, Inc., ("Innerlight") on February 10, 2001, as

Innerlighfs Director of Operations. My current position at Innerlight is Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer.
3.

My current responsibilities include oversight and day-to-day management

and control of the Innerlight.
4.

I am familiar with that certain writing entitled "Exclusive Distributor

Agreement" (the "Agreement"), attached to Innerlight's Complaint in this action. I am
familiar with the language appearing in paragraph 2 (b) of the Agreement.
5.

Innerlight has not made written acceptance to The Matrix Group, LLC

("Matrix"), of a fixed product price list from Matrix.
6.

Innerlight has never received a fixed product price list from Matrix.

7.

Innerlight has made no written waiver of any Agreement term, including

its right to approve a Matrix fixed product price list before contractually obligating itself
to perform under the Agreement.
8.

Innerlight has never intended to waive its rights under the Agreement.

9.

Innerlight placed one order to Matrix for each of the five Sassoon

cosmetic products using one purchase order for each product, all five of which were sent
on the same day. See Product Purchase Orders, attached hereto as Attachments 1-5.
10.

During the same period Innerlight placed its product order with Matrix,

Innerlight also placed one order for certain incidental accessories, i.e., boxes, sponges,
etc., (using separate purchase orders).

11.

In response to Innerlight's product order, Innerlight received seven

invoices, six from Natural Bronze, LLC ("Natural Bronze"), and one from Matrix. See
Product Invoices, attached hereto as Attachments 6-12. Innerlight has not contracted
with Natural Bronze to provide any Beverly Sassoon cosmetic products.
12.

Upon receiving invoices for its product order, Innerlight made seven

product payments to Natural Bronze. Innerlight did not make any payments to Matrix on
any product or accessory invoices, but only made one payment to Matrix for an
appearance fee. See Product Payments, attached hereto as Attachments 13-19.
13.

Following the sale of certain Sassoon products purchased from Matrix,

Innerlight received complaints from customers including, that a facial product caused
"burning" to the customer's skin, that a lotion was "runny," and that lotion pumps were
inoperable.

Dated this A /

day of September, 20p6.

V

/

We^6yfate

Subscribed and Sworn to before me, this lin day of September, 2006.
NOTARY PUBLIC

^

ROSEMARY HUlSrfl
111N200W
Provo, UT 84601
My Commission Expires
November 14,2007

uxu

Notarv^rublic

STATE OF UTAH

Residing a t ^ T X / H I k i t i J h

My commission expires: j [ (4

01

Summary of Attachments

to
Affidavit of Wes Tate
(Supporting Innerlight's A/lotion for Summary

Judgment)

Runchase?
Orders
Attachment
Number

1
2
3
4
5

Purchase
Purchase Order
Submitted To
Order Number
Matrix

20978

Order Date Sassoon Product Description Quantity
Skin-Deep OxyPlex
10/11/2004
10,000

Matrix

20979

10/11/2004

Facial Cleanser

5,000

$13,750 00

Matrix

20980

10/11/2004

Day Creme with SPF 20

5,000

$29,500 00

Matrix

20981

10/11/2004

24-7 pHydration TR Treatment

5,000

$28,750 00

Matrix

20982

10/11/2004

DermaPeel Complex

5,000

$112,500 00 I

Total Price
$78,500 00

Invoices
/Attachment
Number

;.^MUMfi

$mm$mm

88M9HH
ztfrm&ii
&&mm-4
s&mmg#
mmmm

Invoice
Invoice Number Invoice Date Sassoon Product Description Quantity
Skin-Deep OxyPlex
10/21/2004
1446
10,000
Natural Bronze
Day Creme with SPF 20
10/21/2004
1447
971
Natural Bronze
Invoice From:

24-7 pHydration TR Treatment

Mtachmerit
Number

955

$2,626.25
$21,847 50

4,045

$10,535.25

3,477

$20,514.30

24-7 pHydration TR Treatment ! 4,029
DermaPeel Complex
4,029

$23,166 75

Facial Cleanser

Natural Bronze

1466

Day Creme with SPF 20

Natural Bronze

1467

11/16/2004

Natural Bronze

1468

11/16/2004

1506

12/6/2004 l

Payee on Check Check Number

I

Day Creme with SPF 20

Date on
Check

Check
Amount

1.3,

Natural Bronze

64864

10/31/2004

$35,785 90

n
as

Natural Bronze

64865

10/31/2004

$78,500 00

Natural Bronze

65084

12/9/2004

$90,652 50

1i6

Natural Bronze

65086

12/9/2004

$20,514 30

w
m

Natural Bronze

65087

12/9/2004

$23,166.75

Natural Bronze

65105

12/9/2004

$9,934.38

Natural Bronze

65451

2/25/2005

$3,162 40

19,

$5,583.25

971

11/16/2004

§amm^

$5,728.90

DermaPeel Complex
11/16/2004

Matrix

$78,500 00

Facial Cleanser

1464

Natural Bronze

971

Invoice I
Total Price

' Additional purchase orders-not included in this one-time order of cosmetic products-were
submitted for incidental accessories (boxes, sponges, etc )

536

]

$90,652 50
$3,162 40 j

Exhibit D
Attachment #1

PO NUMBER:

20978

The PO number must appear on all related correspondence,
shipping papers, and invoices.

Phone 801 -65MJ605
Fax
801 -65&-0622

«>60S
JT 84606

George Bush Blvd #101
ay, FL 33482

SHIP TO
InnerLight Inc.
867 E 2260 S
PROVO, UT 84606

'hone No:
:
axNo:

Phone (801) 65 5-0605

(888) 862-3227
(561)330-7596

/endor ID. No.

622

)ATE

REQUISITIONER

I/2004

Kathy Christiansen

SHIP VIA

F.O.B. POINT

JTY

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

3,000

510000

510000: Skin-Deep OxyPlex''

DISCOUNT

TERMS

WAREHOUSE

None

UNIT
PRICE

TOTAL
PRICE

7.8500

78,500.00

9l4l

TOTAL:

78,500.00

Please send two copies of your Invoice.
Enter this orderin accordance with the prices,terms,delivery method
and specifications listed above.
Please notify us immediately If you arc unable to ship as specified.
Send invoice lo:
tanerUghl Inc.
.G7E22S0S
frovo.UT B4B06

Authorized uf'

Panp 1 nf

1

Exhibit D
Attachment #2

V\J
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t

The PO number musl appear on all related correspondence
shipping papers, and invoices.

ERLifiJl
»60 S
Jl 34606

Phone 801 -655-0605
Fax
801-655-0622

SHIP TO
InnerLight Inc.
867 E 2260 S
PROVO, UT 84606

1 George Bush Blvd #101
•ay, FL 33482
3

hone No:
-ax Ho:

(888) 862-3227
(561)330-7596

/endor ID. No.

Phone (801) 655-0605

622

)ATE

REQUISITIONER

1/2004

Kathy Christiansen

SHIP VIA

F.OB. POINT

DISCOUNT

TERMS

WAREHOUSE

|
1

None

2TY

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

UNIT
PRICE

TOTAL
PRICE

.;000

520000

520000: Sassoon Facial Cleanser

2.7500

13,750,00

TOTAL:

13,750.00

Please send two copies of your Invoice.
Enter this order In accordance with the prices,terms,delivery method
and specifications listed above.
Please notHy us Immediately if ycu arc unable to ship as spec Hied.
Send invoice to:
InnerLight Inc.
867 E 2260 S
frwo.UT 84606

Authorized by

Page 1 of

1

Exhibit D
Attachment #3

PO NUMBER:

20&B0

The PO number musl appear on all related correspondence,
shipping papers, and invoices.

ERLlfiHTi
Phone 801-655-0605
Fay
Rni-fifi5-Ofi2?

i60 S
IT RiimR

alrix
77 George Bush B l v d # l 01

SHIP TO
InnerLighl Inc.
867 E 2260 S
PROVO, UT 8 4 6 0 6

dray, FL 33482
D
r

hone No:
ax No:

(888)862-3227
(561)330-7596

/endor ID. No.

Phone (801) 655-0605

622

)ATE

REQU1SITIONER

1/2004

Kathy Christiansen

SHIP VIA

F.O.B. PCHNT

DISCOUNT

WAREHOUSE

TERMS
None

2TY

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

UNIT
PRICE

TOTAL
PRICE

i.OOO

520010

520010: Sassoon Day Creme with SPF20

5.9000

29,500.00

TOTAL:

29,500.00

Please send two copies of your invoice.
Enter this orderin accordance with (he prices, ferms, delivery method
and specifications listed above.
Please notify us immediately J/ ycu arc until* to ship as specif kd.
Send invoice to:
InnerLighl inc.
367 E 2260 S
/rovo.UT B4606

-AtfiA

AutlJorireoby

Date

Page 1 of

1

Exhibit D
Attachment #4

PO NUMBER:

20981

The PO number must appear on all rel sled correspondence,
shipping papers, and invoices.

Phone 801-655-0605
Fav
RM-fW-nR?2

50 S
JT B4606

Lrix
7 George Bush BlvdtflOl

SHIP TO
InnerLight Inc
867 E 2260 S
PROVO, UT 8 4 6 0 6

ray, FL 33482
'hone No:
:
ax No:

(888) 862-3227
(561)330-7596

/endor ID. No.

Phone (801) 655-0605

622

>ATE

REQUISITIONER

I/2004

Kathy Christiansen

SHIP VIA

F.O.B. POINT

DISCOUNT

TERMS
None

WAREHOUSE
L_

.

3TY

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

UNIT
PRICE

TOTAL
PRICE

,000

520020

520020: Sassoon 24-7 pHydration TR Treatment

5.7500

28,750.00

HI

TOTAL:

28,750.00

1 ease sond two copies of your Invoice.
inter this order In accordance with the pnces,terms,delivery method
ind specifications listed above.
'tease notKy us Immediately If you are unable to ship as specified.
>end invoice lo:
nnerLight Inc.
P
E2280S
<j7E23
,UT 84G06
iovo.l

Authorized by /

Date

A

_r

A

Exhibit D
Attaclmient #5

PO NUMBER:

20982

The PO number must appear on all related correspondence,
shipping papers, and invoices.

[RUG in
Phone 801-655-0605
Fax
801-655-0622

>60 S
UT 84606

.trix
H George Bush Blvd #101
Iray, FL 33482
Phone No:
Fax No:

SHIP TO
InnerLight inc.
867 E 2260 S
PROVO. UT 84606

(888) 862-3227
(561)330-7596

Vendor ID. No.

Phone (801) 655-0605

622

DATE

REQUISITIONER

1/2004

Kathy Christiansen

SHIP VIA

F.O.B. POINT

DISCOUNT

WAREHOUSE

TERMS
None

j

UNrr
QTY

ITEM

DESCRIPTION

),000

520030

52003CI: DermaPeel C<Dmplex

PRICE
22.5000

I

TOTAL
PRICE
112,500.00

11

TOTAL:

112,500.00

Please send two copies of your Invoice,
Enter this order In accordance with the prices, terms, delivery method
and specifications listed above.
Please notify us immediately If you arc unable to ship as specified.
Send invoice to:
InnerLight inc.
8G7EZ260S
>rovo,UT 84606

uJLfJl.

Authorized by

|

Oate
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Exhibit D
Attaclimenl #6

Invoice

Natural Bronze
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 201
1.177 George Bush B l v d
Defray Beach, FL 3 3 4 8 3

Dale

Invoiced

10/21/2004

1440

1

lb\
Ship To

Bin To

binerlight
iCathy Chriatinnaen
R67E2260S
Provo, UT R4606

Innerhght
Kulhy GbrltiUamien
867 H 2260 S
Provo,UTK4606

Via

P.O. Number

Terme

Rap

Ship

20978

Due. on receipt

HA

10/11/2004

Quantity

Description

Item Code

10,000 510000

Project!

F.O.B.

Price Each

Skin-Deep OxyPlex

Ambunt
7.S5

PK,5MUX)

<bt& M

^

(A Hf\

fa**"

Jd or

^

A

<\

v^ \

J1

i-.l II I I

.

I J|-»U_I

Exhibit D
Attaclimenl #7

Invoice

Natural Bronze
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 201
1 ] 77 George BUG!) Blvd
D e l m y B o a o h , F L 33483

Date

Invoioo #

10/21/2004

1447

|

Ship To

Bill To

lnnerlighl

Innerlight
Kuthy Chrisl'ianacn
867 E 22.60 fi
Provo.UT 84606

lCaliiy Chrictiwuen
c/o Tuacany Suites
LUD Vcguu

Terms

Rep

Ship

Via

F.O.B.

Due on receipt:

HA

10/14/2004

UPS

CA

ProJBd

5.90
5.75
2.75
22.50

Suauocm Pay Creme with SPF20
bassoon. 24-7 pHydrnticm TR IVeatmcnt
Sassoan Facial ClcaoHcr
DcrniuPeel Complex
| Balance of Order to Ship "WudncaduY, October 27,2004

Amount

Price Eaeh

Description

• .5,728.90
5,5S3.25
.2,626.25
21 TB47.50

\

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Saloon Day Crane with SPF20
Sassoon 24-7 pHydrution TR MVeatraont
S as BO on Facial Qcunucr
DcimuPwl Comply

Total

S35.7C5.90 !

?0

Exhibit D
Attaclimeiit #8

Natural Bronze

Invoice

Gulf Stream Building, Suite 201
1177 Geoi^c Bush Blvd
Dclray Beach, FL 33483

Bill To

Date

Invoice #

;

I i/16/2004

J 464

Ship To

Inncrlight
K-athy Chrlatlmxcn
867 B22608
Provo, UnMfiOfi

Term6

Rep

Ship

20979

Due on receipt

HA

11/16/2004

Item Code

•4,045 520000

/<?

Innerllghf
Kttthy Christiansen
867 B 2260 S
Prove, UT 84606

=>.0. Number

Quantity

1

Description

Vte

F.O.B.

Project

CA
Price Each

Saasoon Facial Cleanser

Amount
2.7i

Order is complete!

0.635.2S

PPROVED

Total

ShJ.33.7S

Exhibit D
Attacliment #9

invoice

Natural Bronze
Qulf Stream Building, Suite 201
1177 George BushBlvd
Dclray Beach, FL 33483

|

Bill To

J

11/16/21)04

1466

Inncriight
Ktttby Chrirtianfion
867 E 2260 fi
PIOYO,UT84M)6

Terms

Rep

Ship

Due on receipt

MA

11/16/2004

0. Number

auantity

Invoice #

ShlpTo

innorligbl
Kuthy Christiansen
B67E2260S
l»rovofUT*4iiOCi

20980

Date

DeeorlpUon

Item Cod©

3,477 520010

Vb

F.O.B.

Project

CA
Price Each

Sassoon Day Crcmt with SPF20

Amoun
5.<J0

20,514.30

552 Pieces to fallow

/APPROVED

Total

520,514.30

i

Exhibit D
Attachment #10

Invoice

Natural Bronze
Gulf Stream Building, Suite 2 0 1

L

1177 George Bush Blvd
Delray Beach, FL 33483

Innorlight
Kufhy Girisiiansen
867 H 2260 S
ProvojUT 84606

.O. Number
20981

Quantity

**te

Invoice #

11/16/2004

1467

Ship To

Bill To

l

D

Inncrlighl
KnrhyChrJfltlanBon
867E2260 g
Provo,UT 84606

Terms

Rep

Ship

Due on receipt

HA

11/16/2004

Item Code

4,029 520020

Via

' ^

7

F.O.B,

Project

CA

Description

Price Each

Sassoon 24-7 pHydration TR Treatment

Amount
5.75

23,166.75

J
Order is complete!

PPROVED

-TVT

-C-

Total

523,166.75

Exhibit D
Attachment #12

Invoice

Matrix Group LLC
1355 West Palmetto Parle Road
Suite #348
Boon Raton, FL 33486

Date

Involoe #

12/6/2004

1506

BUI To
lnnet%ht
KnthY Christiansen
B67E22G0S
Provo, U7* S4f»06

Description

•Quantity

P.O. No.

Termo

20980

Due on rccaipt

Project

Rate

Sassoan Day Creme with SPF20

Amount
5.90

si

OVED

Total

Exhibit D
Attachment #13

irLight Inc.

64864

NATURAL BRONZE
Type
Reference
atc
Y71/2004
Bill
1447

ions Expense

INVOICE//1447

'
Original Ami.
35,785.90

m ! /2004

Balance Due
Discount
35,785.90
Check Amount

Paymenl
35,785.90
35,785.90

35,785.90

Exhibit D
Attachment #14

LerLight

Inc.

U*tUUJ

NATURAL BRONZE
Dale
111 1/2004

Zions Expense

Type
Bill

Reference
1446

INVOICE* 1446

Original Ami.
78,500.00

10/31/2004
Discount
Balance Due
78,500.00
Check Amount

Paymenl
78,500.00
78,500.00

78,500.00

Exhibit D
Attachment #15

NATURAL BRONZE
Date
I l/J 6/2004

Zions Expense

Type
Bill

Reference
1468

INVOICE* 1468

12/9/2004
Original Ami
90,652 50

Balance Due
Discounl
90,652 50
Check Aniounl

Payment
90,652 50
90,652 50

90,652.50

Exhibit D
Attachment #16

NATURAL BRONZE
Dale
Type
Reference
1466
11/16/2004
Bill

Original Ami.
20,514.30

12/9/2004
Discount
Balance Due
20,514.30
Check Amount

Payment
20,514.30
20,514.30

20,514.30
Zions Expense

INVOICE// 1466

Exhibit D
Attachment #17

Date
11/16/2004

1 ype
Bill

Reference
1467

Original Ami
23,166 75

Balance Due
23,166 75

Discount
Check Amount

Payment
23,166 75
23,166 75

23,166 75
Zions Expense

rNVOICEtf 1467

Exhibit D
Attachment #18

e'rLight Inc.
NATURAL BRONZE
Type
Reference
)alc
1464
Bill
\ /16/2004
1505
Bill
/19/2004

Original Ami.
10,535.25
4,794.51

12/9/2004
Disco unl
Balance Due
9.93438
600.87
Check Amounl

Payment
9,934.38
600.87
10,535.25

10,535.25
Zions Expense

INVOICE//
1464
1,NYW

Exhibit D
Attachment #19

ICK: 065451

NT UTiiuusA

02/25/2005

srsLi cOTSoatm iz/on

NATURAL BRONZE

CHECK TOTAL:

22,823.92

